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Introduction: Law, Borders, and Speech
The Internet is global. State power and laws usually are not. Online information seeping across
borders can reveal human rights abuses to the outside world, help oppressed minorities find allies
in other countries, and bring down tyrants. The same unchecked flow of information can
undermine the rule of law in democratic countries and help purveyors of dangerous content reach
a global audience. Tensions between national law and the Internet’s global architecture have
existed since the network’s earliest days, but become more consequential with each passing year.
David G. Post and David R. Johnson foresaw these issues in their seminal 1996 Stanford Law
Review article, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace. The piece was, in Professor
Anupam Chander’s words, a Helen of Troy among legal publications—the law review article
that launched a thousand law review articles. Two decades later, Stanford Law School’s Center
for Internet and Society convened the Law, Borders, and Speech Conference to reconsider these
questions in light of today’s more crowded, complex, and contested Internet. It asked experts
from around the world to discuss questions about online speech and information, including


When can one country’s laws control speech and access to information around the
world? Should some content be universally illegal? Are some legal claims—based on
human rights, intellectual property, or data protection, for example—uniquely eligible for
cross-border enforcement?



Could Cyberspace be, as Post and Johnson suggested, ‘a distinct “place” for purposes of
legal analysis’—de-linked from territorial jurisdiction? If the ‘laws’ of that ‘place’ are
made by private companies (such as conference sponsors Facebook and Google), what
does that mean for national governments and the rule of law?



Should Internet platforms use technical means to block countries where their services, or
information posted by their users, violate national law? Should the answer depend on the
country, the technology, or the law at issue?

Conference participants grappling with these questions included company and government
representatives, academics, technologists, industry and civil society spokespeople, and more.
Speakers came from as far away as Brussels and Argentina, and as close as Twitter and Stanford.
One participant called his fellow panelists “the best folks on the subject in the country—or
probably the world.” Another described the entire audience as a “double black diamond crowd.”
A major theme that emerged from the discussion was the power of non-legal forces in shaping
online information. Most conspicuously, platforms themselves can act as substitutes for state
power—“adjudicating” speech rights under their own Community Guidelines, rather than law.
As Emma Llansó and Evelyn Aswad discussed, this expanding corporate power does not
necessarily reduce that of government. States that delegate enforcement to platforms can
effectively regulate speech by proxy, avoiding constitutional free expression or due process
constraints that might otherwise apply. Political pressure from influential nations can have
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powerful extraterritorial effect when—as with the European Commission’s Code of Conduct for
hate speech—platforms agree to “voluntarily” remove content around the world.
Platforms can also act as state proxies when they erect technical barriers, or geoblocks,
preventing people in certain countries from accessing forbidden content. David Drummond noted
that governments may effectively escape public accountability for their choices by compelling
foreign companies to block citizens’ access to information—rather than transparently exercising
state power and, like China, erecting online barriers themselves. As Joe Hall discussed, though,
virtual borders can also become more or less meaningful over time, as the arms race between
geoblocking and circumvention technologies progresses.
In other cases, market forces can—for good or ill—lead to unintended consequences for online
expression. Small websites’ increasing reliance on large-scale web hosting providers like
Amazon Web Services may, as Alex Feerst pointed out, effectively concentrate decisions about
online expression in the hands of a few companies. Unlike their smaller, local counterparts,
multi-national hosting providers may be vulnerable to pressure from numerous governments
around the world. At the same time, the power of users can drive important change. As Nicole
Wong noted, key questions for platforms in an age of trolling and polarization may concern the
demands of users, as much as those of governments. User input and pressure could yet become,
in some form, the powerful constitutive force that Post and Johnson envisioned.
A second major conference theme was the misfit between today’s speech and jurisdiction
problems and the legal tools available to address them. As discussed in one panel, the European
“Right to Be Forgotten” illustrates the challenge. Advocates on all sides of that issue see it as
fundamentally a question of human rights—the right to privacy, the right to free expression and
historical memory, or all of the above in complex balance. For judges, though, it will not be
framed in those terms. Courts including the Court of Justice of the European Union are instead
asked to resolve highly technical, doctrinal questions about Data Protection law. Data Protection
is far from alone in this regard. In one conversation after another, experts found that existing
substantive law—on topics from intellectual property to law enforcement data access—provided
little clear guidance on cross-border enforcement. A survey of conference participants, asking
about interpretations of current law and predictions for the future, identified more points of
disagreement than consensus. (See Appendix)
How then to move forward? As a third and perhaps most important theme, participants discussed
the tools needed to arrive at wiser outcomes. A top priority is simply more conversation between
affected entities. In particular, non-judicial government bodies such as trade, telecommunication,
or foreign ministries should join the discussion, as well as technologists, private companies and
civil society. Bertrand de la Chapelle described the ongoing work of the Internet and Jurisdiction
Policy Network in providing a forum for just such multistakeholder dialog.
Another pressing need is to identify relevant sources of law and develop new analyses to help
courts wrangle with questions of online speech and jurisdiction. As Leah Bishop Shaver and Dan
Svantesson discussed, attention to the geographic scope of remedies—under existing black letter
remedies law or within a court’s initial jurisdiction analysis—can provide a starting point.
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Human rights law, too, has an important role to play. This is not solely because of the ideals it
represents. In the Internet jurisdiction context, human rights law provides a unique and sorely
needed starting point of relative consensus and established legal language, already agreed upon
by governments around the world. As Paul Schabas discussed, the concept of the “margin of
appreciation”—meaning the leeway states have to adopt different, equally permissible,
interpretations of rights—may provide some guidance. As Paul argued in a brief for Human
Rights Watch, Article 19, and other organizations in Canada’s Equustek case, this matters for
jurisdiction. When countries interpret rights differently within the margin of appreciation—for
example, striking different balances between information and privacy rights—human rights
doctrine suggests that no country should impose its version on the others.
The Law, Borders, and Speech conference provided a forum for vibrant discussion and crosspollination among experts working on diverse facets of these issues. This volume attempts to put
that lightning in a bottle. It includes a brief summary of each panel, and an Appendix of
conference materials, such as hypothetical scenarios discussed at the conference and the results
of participant surveys. We hope these materials can be used to expand the conversation begun at
the conference, broadening it and sparking new ideas and strategies for the rapidly evolving law
of online speech and jurisdiction.

Daphne Keller
Stanford Center for Internet and Society
Director of Intermediary Liability
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Big Picture
Summary by David G. Post and David R. Johnson
Watch Video

Panelists:


Bertrand de la Chapelle - Co-Founder and Director, Internet & Jurisdiction Project



David R. Johnson - CEO, argumentz.com; Producer, themoosical.com



Andrew McLaughlin - Medium; Access Now



David G. Post - Professor of Law (ret.), Temple University Law School; Contributor,
Volokh Conspiracy



Paul Sieminski - General Counsel, Automattic



Nicole Wong - Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group

From the Agenda:
Which countries’ laws and values will govern Internet users’ online behavior, including
their free expression rights? In 1996, David G. Post and David R. Johnson wrote that
“The rise of the global computer network is destroying the link between geographical
location and: (1) the power of local governments to assert control over online behavior;
(2) the effects of online behavior on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of the
efforts of a local sovereign to enforce rules applicable to global phenomena; and (4) the
ability of physical location to give notice of which sets of rules apply.” They proposed
that national law must be reconciled with self-regulatory processes emerging from the
network itself.
Twenty years on, what have we learned? How are we reconciling differences in national
laws governing speech, and how should we be reconciling them? What are the
responsibilities of Internet speakers and platforms when faced with diverging rules
about what online content is legal? And do users have relevant legal rights when their
speech, or the information they are seeking, is legal in their own country?
************
David G. Post, reviewing what the original Law and Borders paper got right (and what it got
wrong), noted that the central dilemma it had identified—the conflict between an a-territorial
global network and an international legal system with territoriality at its core—had certainly
proved to be a profoundly challenging one. He suggested that the failure (thus far) to make much
headway on these problems of “governance on the Internet” (in Bertrand de la Chapelle’s phrase)
1

may be pushing these problems “upward,” to the institutions (e.g., ICANN) concerned with
“governance of the Internet,” as they face increasing pressure to leverage their control over
critical infrastructure to exercise greater control over online content and conduct.

Institutions like ICANN, concerned with “governance of the Internet,” face
increasing pressure to leverage their power over critical infrastructure to
control online content.

David R. Johnson suggested that the framework for resolving conflicting claims from multiple
sources of rules is to be found in Paul Schiff Berman’s work on “cosmopolitan pluralism.” All
contending jurisdictions should agree to defer to the jurisdiction that has the strongest claim to be
the source of decision in a particular case. The strongest claims come from those rule sources—
which need not be limited to nation states but which can include online communities—that are
“congruent” (i.e., show a high degree of overlap between those affected by the rules and those
whose wellbeing was taken into account when making the rules) and which have a viable claim
to represent the “consent of the governed.” This suggests that online global platforms (like
Facebook and Google) would have stronger claims to deference by local law (to their community
standards and Terms of Service) if they provided for some form of democratic community
oversight.
De la Chappelle observed that the developed legal systems handle the central questions in the
administration of law—who sets the rules/norms? to whom do they apply? who adjudicates
disputes arising out of them?—remarkably well inside their recognized borders, but that the
cross-border nature of Internet interactions subverts that framework, posing the challenge of
managing diverse norms in shared online spaces. Unfortunately, the current default relationship
among local States seeking to address the problem of conflicting rule-sets is not comity but a
form of non-cooperation, as States seek to impose their own rules and values on a global basis.
He called for the development of protocols for “legal inter-operability,” paralleling the technical
inter-operability that makes Internet communication possible, and for the formation of multistakeholder fora to discuss specific issues and develop solutions that could be adopted by
platforms and States on a voluntary basis.
Paul Sieminski asked: What is the role of the platform in all of this? The platform providers
(like Auttomatic) have a diverse global user community with its own rules and norms, along with
a particular set of values the provider may be seeking to advance (through, among other vehicles,
its Terms of Service), while at the same time it has data centers, other assets, and employees in
dozens of different countries, each with its own separate legal regime. The platforms thus
become targeted choke points in the assertion of local control, but by the same token may have
more power than individual users to use legal advocacy as a tool to advance important values,
including free expression. Often the big platform companies are the ones fighting the battle—
often without much support from their home States—to protect Internet users’ rights against
overreaching by local sovereigns.
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Platforms can become targeted choke points in the assertion of local control,
but by the same token may have more power than individual users to advance
important values, including free expression.

Nicole Wong noted that the dominant user experience, given the ubiquity of the smart phone and
mobile computing, has perhaps shifted from a remote “cyberspace” and is becoming more
tethered to physical location. Companies certainly take the efforts of local sovereigns to regulate
global platforms into account when deciding where to locate employees and servers and which
markets to enter. When large and well-resourced companies take on litigation or policy fights in
order to protect their users’ rights, the standards they set are often followed by smaller platforms.
“When you fight,” she said of the large companies, “you raise the defenses for all of us—and
when you don’t, everyone else retreats.” She also suggested that legal/jurisdictional problems
posed by global presence may be of less concern to the platform providers than the challenge of
accommodating users with diverse values, and that much of the concern these days about content
control on the Internet is less about what speech is “legal” and more about what speech is “civil.”
Andrew McLaughlin suggested that a significant shift in power on the Internet, from the edge to
the core (in the form of the large platforms and cloud storage), has given local sovereigns a lever
they can try to use to impose regulatory control. Increasingly, the conflicts faced by tech
companies involve differences of law and value between one democratic nation and another
(e.g., India has strict rules about comments critical of others’ religion), and some countries will
attempt to impose rules that others find deeply flawed (e.g., the E.U.’s “Right to Be Forgotten”).
************
The ensuing discussion raised a number of additional issues.
One concerned the relationship between private actors and state actors. De la Chappelle observed
that cross-border takedown requests create an unusual pairing of State and private parties in
resolving complex questions of law and authority. More so than any one government, Internet
intermediaries may have a motivation to arrive at harmonized norms or Terms of Service that
can function across diverse legal systems. Expanding on the point, McLaughlin observed that the
companies may view themselves not merely as commercial actors, but as standing for a set of
values and principles. As pointed out by an audience member, however, this increasing public
role of private actors does not mean that comity and other doctrines historically governing stateto-state relations should extend to them.
Another concerned the complexity of government powers and motivations: must conflicting
interests of different national government institutions—such as security agencies and state
departments—be resolved before transnational agreement is possible? When Internet companies
refuse to remove content based on national law in a country like Turkey, does this effectively
pave the way for more Internet balkanization as governments compel their national ISPs to block
content—or entire services—for users in the country?
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There also was considerable discussion about geo-location and geo-blocking tools (which served
as something of a lead-in to Panel 2, which focused specifically on these technologies): to what
extent can their widespread deployment help solve the cross-border legal inter-operability
problem, allowing content and platform providers to avoid distributing content deemed unlawful
in particular territorial jurisdictions, or, conversely, might they impose unjustifiably high costs
on the free flow of information that has made the Internet so valuable a global platform?

4

Geoblocking Tools and the Law
Summary by Graham Smith
Watch Video

Panelists:


David Drummond - Senior Vice President, Corporate Development, Alphabet



Mike Godwin - Senior Fellow, R Street Institute



Joseph Lorenzo Hall - Chief Technologist, Center for Democracy & Technology



Graham Smith - Partner, Bird & Bird, LLP



Marketa Trimble - Samuel S. Lionel Professor of Intellectual Property Law,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

From the Agenda:
Technical tools can block Internet users from seeing certain content in their countries.
How well do they work, what unintended consequences might they have, and is it a good
idea for law to pressure private companies to adopt them?

************
David Drummond introduced the panel. The significance of this panel is that geoblocking tools
are in many ways defining and enforcing jurisdiction.
A number of themes emerged from the panel.

What is geoblocking?
The session started with a divergence of definitions. Joseph Lorenzo Hall's technical introduction
ranged widely over website and network blocking technologies and described some
circumvention tools. Graham Smith distinguished between technical methods used by sites to
refuse incoming requests (geoblocking) and techniques to prevent outbound requests reaching
their destination (network blocking). Both were discussed extensively during the panel and
discussion.
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Good, bad or neither?
Marketa Trimble identified two purposes for which tools such as VPN and TOR could be used to
circumvent geoblocking: (1) the need to be 'anywhere but' a particular country, which would be
the concern of free speech activists and (2) to appear to be in a specific place, in order to watch a
TV show available only in that location. Geoblocking and VPN should be regarded as neutral
tools and the law should be qualified so that people don’t have to worry about negative legal
implications of using them.
Although, as Trimble observed, geoblocking has been vilified, panelists noted some positive
aspects. For example, Hall has blocked Chinese IP addresses from his josephhall.org website
because users and search engines from the country were using up so much bandwidth. Mike
Godwin noted that geoblocking could be used as a form of protest, such as when some sites
blocked requests from the USA during the SOPA/PIPA ‘going dark' protest. Trimble suggested
that there are situations and places where geoblocking has legitimate purposes and can be likened
to someone placing a lock on their own house when they leave. The same lock on a polling
station at election time would be problematic. It is a tool that can be misused like any other
technical tool. Smith suggested that issues arise when geoblocking is over-incentivised or
compelled.

We are now seeing both of the two worlds envisaged by Johnson and Post:
lowest common denominator of content enforcement and Balkanization based
on terrestrial jurisdictions.

Geoblocking or targeting?
Drummond stressed that geoblocking is often implemented reluctantly, as a less damaging
alternative to global removal of content. He questioned why a targeting regime, in which users
default to content on local domains but can still see content elsewhere if they take steps to do so,
is not sufficient. This preserves the users' right to travel in cyberspace while for the most part
ensuring that people see only local content, since the defaults are very powerful. This sort of
regime handles the territorial problem quite well. Since people can get around geoblocking you
are not getting a lot more law enforcement that way.

The right to travel in cyberspace
The idea of the right to travel in cyberspace provoked discussion. Trimble referred to her 2012
paper in which she had explored right to travel arguments. In the physical world there are
limitations, such as needing a passport to travel abroad. In cyberspace, it is up for debate what
kinds of limitations are appropriate in which situations. Drummond said that Google had always
resisted geoblocking because while it did not deprive the whole world from seeing content in
places where it is legal, it does eliminate the right to travel.
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Smith observed that if your starting point is that your citizens, whether they were inside or
outside your borders, should under no circumstances be able to access content governed by a
different legal regime, then you are unlikely to think that a targeting regime works well.
However, this approach imposes more restrictive borders than in the offline world. It is
something more like the Berlin Wall, whose purpose was to keep people in. In cyberspace,
keeping information out keeps people in.

Granularity
Some discussion centered around granularity. Hall argued against establishing default rules that
would effectively require constant, granular tracking of Internet and mobile users’ location,
undermining their privacy. Godwin commented that we do not know what 100% effective
blocking of objectionable content looks like except to totally Balkanize the Internet. We are now
seeing both of the two worlds envisaged by Johnson/Post: lowest common denominator of
content enforcement and Balkanization based on terrestrial jurisdictions.
Trimble commented that a digital passport would need, at a certain level of abstraction,
information about where the user is from and what kind of content is available to it.

Jurisdiction rules that effectively require constant, granular tracking of
Internet and mobile users’ location can also undermine their privacy.

A prohibition arms race?
A recurring theme in the discussion was the tendency towards a prohibition arms race: blocking
followed by circumvention followed by action against circumvention. At each stage prohibitions
tend to become more general, leading to increasing negative effects as legitimate behaviour is
affected. Hall noted that the use of VPN tunnels can be countered by a service blocking VPN exit
points, which prevents those who need to use VPN from using the service. However, one new
tool—called Streisand—runs multiple flavors of VPN, allowing increasing agility to users
seeking to circumvent censorship. For example, the Streisand tool can make all communications
look like credit card transactions, which censors are loathe to block, lest they impact Internet ecommerce in their region. As Hall and others have seen emerging in the field, governments may
now be deploying machine learning techniques—effectively artificially-intelligent systems that
can “learn” to spot leaks in the Great Firewall—to counter these new tools.
Trimble asked whether circumvention of geoblocking is a widespread practice leading to
significant erosion of territoriality or had negligible spillover. Should we abandon attempts to
achieve territoriality, or regulate the spillover?
Smith commented that Johnson/Post had predicted that attempts to preserve borders in
cyberspace would prove futile. However, we have to bear in mind what timespan we are
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considering. We don't know if we are witnessing the brink of a new era of a Balkanized Internet
or the last thrashings of the dinosaurs.

Big company rules for small actors?
The discussion moved on to the effect on small actors of making laws on the basis of what the
large players can do, such as geoblocking. Will the local online newspaper simply block the rest
of the world to avoid the problem of understanding the laws of every other country? What other
unintended consequences may arise from geoblocking becoming a norm, if indeed it is a norm?
Godwin observed that Google has the resources to be responsive and make discriminations
among cases. The chances are a new market entrant would not be able to do that. This raises the
barrier to entry. Trimble emphasized the importance of the possibility of choice. A small
newspaper told that it could not geoblock might have no option but to obtain a global or regional
copyright license, which it might not be able to afford.
It was suggested that countries might adopt a twin strategy of controlling large companies
providing protocols such as VPN through licensing requirements, and putting small disruptive
technologists out of business. Hall said it would be unfortunate if pressure put on such
developers led to them having to remain anonymous in order to develop secure communications
tools.
The possibility of crafting different laws based on different sizes of company was also raised.
That would require consideration of what is meant by size, when a small company is capable of
having a large effect on the Internet.
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Intellectual Property
Summary by Annemarie Bridy
Watch Video

Panelists:


Annemarie Bridy - Professor of Law, University of Idaho; Affiliate Scholar, Stanford
Center for Internet and Society



Ben Sheffner - Senior Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Copyright & Legal
Affairs, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA)



Corynne McSherry - Legal Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation



Alex Feerst - Head of Legal, Medium

From the Agenda:
Is intellectual property uniquely eligible for global enforcement, because it is relatively
harmonized around the world by treaties? Are territorial restrictions so baked into
copyright licensing and business practices that the law must compel geoblocking on
copyright grounds? When and why should the law push in the opposite direction by
prohibiting geoblocking—as the EU recently announced it would do for some
copyrighted content?

************
The topic of this panel was cross-border issues in the online enforcement of intellectual property
rights. The speakers brought a range of perspectives from the movie industry (Ben Sheffner), the
public interest sector (Corynne McSherry), academia (Annemarie Bridy), and the tech industry
(Alex Feerst).
The panel began with a discussion of Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, a case then pending before
the Supreme Court of Canada.1 In the case, Google challenged a lower court’s injunction
requiring it to remove search results not only from its Canadian services, but globally. The sites
belonged to the defendants, who were accused of trade secret misappropriation and trademark
infringement. The defendants fled Canada during the course of the litigation, which led the court
to strike their defenses as a sanction. The trial court ultimately issued an order enjoining the
1

2015 BCCA 265, available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/CA/15/02/2015BCCA0265.htm. The
panel discussion predated the Canadian Supreme Court’s subsequent decision, which affirmed the
appellate ruling.
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defendants from using Equustek’s trade secrets and from selling infringing inventory. The
defendants predictably disregarded the court’s order. They continued to sell products from
various websites they controlled from indeterminate locations. Equustek asked Google to
globally remove search results for the defendants’ websites, which Google refused to do. Google
agreed only to remove infringing URLs from results on its Canadian search service at
www.google.ca. Equustek argued before the trial court that Google should be compelled to do
more.
The trial court agreed. Specifically, the court held that (1) the plaintiffs were suffering
irreparable harm by the defendants’ ongoing sales of infringing inventory on the Internet; (2)
Google was inadvertently facilitating that harm through its search engines; (3) the plaintiffs had
no alternative to the application brought against Google; (4) the relief sought against Google
would not cause Google any expense or inconvenience, and was only a slight expansion of what
Google agreed to do voluntarily; and (5) for the orders against the defendants to be effective,
even within Canada, Google must stop displaying the defendants’ websites on Google’s search
results on all of Google’s websites, not just www.google.ca.
Google appealed the trial court’s decision and asked the Court of Appeals to set aside the order.
Google made three ultimately unsuccessful arguments. First, Google argued that the order was
contrary to both Canadian jurisprudence on orders that restrict freedom of expression and
parliamentary guidance on the grant of injunctions against search engines. Second, Google
argued that the trial court erred in applying rules concerning injunctions against non-parties to
the litigation before them. Finally, Google argued that the order violated principles of
international comity. The Court of Appeals rejected all of Google’s arguments and upheld the
worldwide injunction. In a ruling that post-dated the panel discussion, the Canadian Supreme
Court affirmed.
Equustek is a controversial case because the court’s order required Google to de-list search
results worldwide—not just from the company’s Canada-targeted service at www.google.ca,
which the company said was used by some 95% of its customers in Canada. In effect, a Canadian
court asserted its authority over the contents of search results globally, for Canadians and
everyone else. The extraterritorial reach of the Canadian court’s order raised difficult questions
about the relationship between law and borders in cyberspace.
After summarizing the case, Sheffner discussed the MPAA’s position concerning the issuance of
non-party injunctions against Internet intermediaries in cases of online infringement where
defendants disregard court orders entered against them and thereby frustrate plaintiffs’ ability to
realize their remedies. He described a four-factor test proposed in an amicus brief filed in the
Supreme Court of Canada in Equustek by the Fédération Internationale des Associations de
Producteurs de Films (FIAPF), a trade group of which the MPAA is a member. Under the
FIAPF’s proposed test, the four factors a court should consider are: (1) the likely effectiveness of
the order in remedying the harm caused to the claimants, and the availability of alternative
remedies; (2) the cost to the intermediary of implementing the order; (3) the impact of the order
on freedom of expression; and (4) evidence that the order will have extraterritorial effect in a
manner that offends comity. Under this test, Sheffner asserted, the order issued in Equustek was
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proper and should be upheld. At the same time, he suggested, the test would not support global
removal based on speech-restrictive laws that vary widely between countries, such as laws
against blasphemy.
McSherry argued that such an approach would not adequately protect speech and due process
rights around the world, and said that a ruling in Equustek’s favor would set dangerous
precedent. She described two alternative multi-factor tests presented to the Canadian Supreme
Court in amicus briefs filed by the EFF and human rights organizations. EFF recommended that
the Court consider six factors before issuing an order against a non-party online intermediary: (1)
whether the order would offend another (relevant) State’s core values; (2) whether the plaintiff
made a strong prima facie case on the underlying claim; (3) whether the defendant is causing
substantial irreparable harm; (4) whether the order is narrowly tailored to address that harm; (5)
whether the order is technically feasible and effective; and (6) whether the balance of equities
favors issuance. Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations in a joint brief
suggested to the Court a test derived from the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Under that test, the Court would consider (1) whether the order is valid under domestic
law; (2) whether it is necessary to protect rights, national security, public order, public health, or
morals; and (3) whether it is proportional in light of impacts on freedom of expression and
alternative means of achieving the goal. Applying these tests, both EFF and the human rights
organizations urged the Canadian Supreme Court to overturn the lower court’s decision.

Amicus briefs from trade groups and civil society organizations in Equustek
proposed competing legal tests for cross-border orders to restrict online
information.

Sheffner and McSherry agreed in principle that protecting freedom of expression is important in
these kinds of cases, and that consideration of conflicting speech norms between relevant States
is necessary, both in its own right and as an element of the international comity analysis.
McSherry expressed concern that the ability of national courts to issue Internet-wide injunctions
against online intermediaries could lead to a “race to the bottom” in which plaintiffs forum shop
for courts in jurisdictions with weak speech norms and strong copyright laws. She emphasized
that applying principles of comity to cases involving conflicts over online content removal
requires consideration of whether the relevant jurisdictions recognize fair use and, if so, whether
they recognize it to the same extent. In response to concerns about asymmetrical fair use norms
between jurisdictions, Sheffner asserted that the MPAA does not seek injunctions against online
intermediaries in “close” copyright cases, meaning those in which fair use would be a colorable
defense in the jurisdictions that recognize it. He expressed a belief that comity concerns are not
triggered by the injunctions the MPAA seeks because the MPAA targets only “blatantly
infringing sites” that have no legitimate claim to fair use.
Bridy, the panel’s third speaker, shifted the discussion of global content blocking from the courts
to the Internet’s technical infrastructure. What if, she asked, the jurisdiction of courts over
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nonparty intermediaries could be made irrelevant to anti-piracy enforcement? What if right
holders could get the keepers of the global Domain Name System (DNS) to start policing content
on websites and unilaterally suspending or cancelling domain names in response to their
complaints?
Responding to these questions, Bridy described recent efforts by right holders to avoid the “law
and borders” issues raised in cases like Equustek by implementing, with ICANN’s cooperation, a
privately ordered framework for notice and blocking within the DNS. The framework is outlined
in a “trusted notifier” agreement between the MPAA and two registry operators—Donuts and
Radix—that control hundreds of new global Top Level Domains (gTLDs), including .movie,
.wine, and .computer.
The backstory on the MPAA-Donuts/Radix agreement begins with ICANN’s launch in 2011 of a
substantial expansion of the Internet’s domain name space through the introduction of over a
thousand new gTLDs. Right holders saw in the new gTLD process an opportunity to inject antipiracy obligations into the hierarchy of private agreements governing the relationship between
ICANN and the various downstream entities that administer the DNS. The MPAA and the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) successfully lobbied within ICANN’s multistakeholder governance forum for a “flow down” provision in the 2013 ICANN-Registry
agreement. The provision requires registries to include in their contracts with registrars a
provision that requires registrars to include in their contracts with registrants a provision that
prohibits copyright infringement and promises consequences for infringement, including
suspension of the domain name.
Citing the prohibition on copyright infringement in the ICANN contracts as their legal
justification, Donuts and Radix have agreed to act as private investigators and adjudicators of the
MPAA’s complaints that domain name registrants are operating “pirate sites.” Under the
agreement, the registry operators treat MPAA’s complaints “expeditiously and with a
presumption of credibility.” The standard for the submission of a complaint is “clear and
pervasive copyright infringement.” Before approaching the registry, MPAA must go first to the
registrar of record and the site’s hosting provider. However, if it is not satisfied with the outcome
of those interactions, the registry operator becomes the private court of last resort.
Bridy identified a host of normative concerns relating to the trusted notifier framework:






There is a presumption of guilt for accused registrants.
Complaints target (and sanctions affect) an entire second-level domain rather than
specific content.
There is a lack of clarity about what constitutes “clear and pervasive copyright
infringement.”
There are no established procedures for registrants to contest complaints and/or appeal
sanctions.
There is a lack of transparency about sanctions taken under the agreement and no
mechanism for public reporting.
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The final panelist, Feerst, offered a practical perspective on “holes” in the DMCA. One
jurisdiction-related issue arises when right holders outside the US send DMCA notices to USbased platforms. Do such notices effectively signal acceptance of US legal jurisdiction over the
dispute, and potentially even waiver of remedies under other countries’ laws? Must right holders
assert only copyright claims that are valid under US law, or can they use the DMCA to assert
claims under the law of the sender’s country? Has notice and takedown for copyright become de
facto harmonized through platforms’ global application of the DMCA?

Has notice and takedown for copyright become de facto harmonized through
platforms’ global application of the DMCA?

Another issue arises from publishing platforms’ increasing reliance on enterprise cloud services.
Feerst explained that many user-generated content (UGC) platforms, including Medium, do not
operate their own servers, but instead rely on third party hosting providers like Amazon Web
Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, or Google Cloud Platform. The cloud provider hosts the
platform’s content, including UGC. This arrangement creates ambiguity and complexity under
the DMCA—as Feerst illustrated with the example of a DMCA takedown notice Medium
received, via AWS, from the government of Ecuador for images published by a user on Medium.
First, the arrangement creates multiple entities that could be viewed as online storage
providers—a content platform as well as its upstream cloud provider. Right holders who want to
file DMCA notices that target content appearing on a content platform like Medium might
logically be expected to file those notices with the platform’s designated DMCA agent. Instead,
however, they might file notices directly with the upstream cloud provider. This creates serious
questions under the DMCA: are both the platform and the cloud provider “hosts” with removal
obligations? What is the permissible turnaround time for “expeditious” removal in this two-host
situation? Can the platform host send a counternotice to the cloud provider? The problem is
exacerbated by the cloud host’s limited technical options: it may be able to shut down a
platform’s entire website and service, but not able to remove an individual item of UGC from
that platform. Finally, the chain of contractual relations running between the intermediaries may,
in practice, displace the law. The content platform may be asked to remove the content in
question with a deadline imposed by private contract, with a time limit that may be less flexible
than the DMCA’s standard of “expeditious” removal. If the content platform fails to remove the
disputed content, it risks breach of its contract and potentially existential consequences for that
breach (at the extreme, termination of the contract and, as a result, removal of all hosted content).
Whereas a content platform would risk a lawsuit from an aggrieved right holder if it chose to
ignore a DMCA notice directed to its own DMCA agent, it potentially risks its entire business
operations if it chooses to ignore a DMCA notice directed to its cloud provider. The DMCA risk
calculus for smaller platforms that outsource hosting to major cloud providers is thus very
different than it is for larger platforms that operate their own storage facilities.
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In a world where web-based publishing platforms routinely rely on cloud storage vendors to host
their UGC, an individual platform can find itself between a rock and a hard place when it comes
to copyright takedown demands. As the apparent-but-not-actual host of its users’ content and as
a user itself of the cloud services that actually store the content, a platform is potentially liable on
two fronts if it resists takedown demands: to right holders for infringement and to its storage
provider for breach of contract/Terms of Service.
In further discussion, the panel considered the jurisdictional significance of the two-host
situation. A platform’s relationship with the cloud provider may also effectively put it within
reach of claimants around the world—including in countries where the platform itself is not
subject to jurisdiction. Even if both the user who creates content and the platform to which he
posts it operate entirely within one country, the same is likely not true of the cloud hosting
provider. Its international business operations may create the basis of jurisdiction for claims
affecting content on small and medium-sized platforms around the world. The consolidation of
Internet infrastructure in the hands of a few major hosting providers may thus create a new, and
under-considered, legal and practical mechanism for cross-border content removal.
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Data Protection and the Right to Be Forgotten
Summary by Joris van Hoboken
Watch Video

Panelists:


Bruce Brown - Executive Director, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press



Mathias Moulin - Deputy Director, Commission Nationale de L'Informatique et des
Libertés



Luiz Moncau - Intermediary Liability Fellow, Stanford Center for Internet and Society



Joris van Hoboken - Senior Researcher, University of Amsterdam

From the Agenda:
One of the biggest Internet jurisdiction disputes of our time is Google’s disagreement
with European Data Protection regulators over global removals of search results based
on EU “Right to Be Forgotten” law. What will happen there, and what should happen?
If courts in the EU or elsewhere find jurisdiction based on the unique territoriality and
processing provisions of Data Protection law, what precedent does that set? How will it
shape cross-border enforcement orders in “libel tourism” cases, copyright cases, or
other claims outside the Data Protection framework?

************
This panel addressed the right to be forgotten (RTBF) from a global perspective, presenting
points of view from relevant stakeholders and academic researchers from different regions. As
established in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 2014 Google Spain case, this is a
right under data protection law for individuals to request that search engines de-list specified
results appearing in response to a search for the individual’s name.2 While search engines may
decline to de-list results based on public interest considerations, the RTBF is still far broader
than de-listing or removal rights in many countries, including the United States. This is
especially the case since de-listing can also be requested for information that lawfully published
online.

2

Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12, May 13, 2014
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After a round of opening statements from the panelists, summarized below, a lively, and at times
provocative, discussion with the audience took place about the conceptual boundaries of the
RTBF, the legitimacy of extra-jurisdictional impacts on free speech, and the possibility of
resistance in view of the RTBF’s impact on the free flow of information online and the right to
freedom of expression of Internet users and publishers. The discussion clarified the potential of
the RTBF to continue to cause principled conflicts over the extent to which national laws should
be allowed to impact the free flow of information outside of national borders, and the difficulties
of reconciling fundamental differences in value systems in practice if jurisdictional overlapping
claims become more common.
Bruce Brown’s presentation opened up the question of stakeholder participation in the RTBF
debate, specifically about the role of news organizations and organizations defending a free press
in the debate about the legitimacy of a RTBF and its proper application. Brown clarified that
press organizations until now had not taken a very leading role in the debate. In the debate about
the RTBF, the news industry and press organizations cannot be seen as monolithic. At the
moment, it appeared to him that they were more in an amicus role rather than in the driver seat
when it comes to free speech norm creation on the Internet. Related to this, Brown also raised the
question of which free speech rights to focus on in the RTBF debate. Should the focus be placed
on the rights of Internet users and readers? Or should the emphasis be on the rights of speakers
and publishers to reach an audience with their publications in different parts of the world,
including through search engines? As the potential impact on the rights of speakers and
publishers was put forward in this presentation, the presentation also raised the question of what
news organizations know about the way in which the RTBF is impacting the dissemination of
their materials to online readers. Would it be possible for news organizations to provide data on
the impact of RTBF de-listings, as part of their readership analytics? Perhaps, news
organizations could play a constructive role in the debate by offering statistics, complementing
transparency reporting efforts in the online services industry.

In the debate about the “Right to Be Forgotten,” the news industry and press
organizations cannot be seen as monolithic.

Mathias Moulin presented the perspective of the French Data Protection Authority, the
Commission Nationale de L'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), and defended the way in which
the RTBF could be seen as the legitimate application of French data protection law. First, Moulin
presented some figures (the absolute and relative number of requests, de-listings, removals for
other reasons than the RTBF, and involvement of CNIL in enforcement of the RTBF),
concluding that the effect of the RTBF in practice was rather limited. If anything, the discussion
of these figures may have raised the question for the audience of how one would assess the
importance of a particular website remaining accessible through a name search, and on what
basis.
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Second, Moulin clarified how the RTBF is the result of the application of long-standing
principles of European data protection (national laws that have existed since the 1970s and were
harmonized in the Data Protection Directive) and European fundamental rights law, in which
freedom of expression has to be balanced with an equally important right to privacy. Moulin
clarified that what may have been new about the RTBF, from the perspective of CNIL, was
simply the result of regulators not having managed to apply existing laws to search engines
before the RTBF ruling. (This argument is not convincing to the author of this summary,
considering the conclusions reached by the Article 29 Working Party in 2008 on how to apply
the Data Protection Directive to search engines).
Third, Moulin addressed the question of whether the RTBF should be considered a threat to
freedom of expression. He answered this question in the negative, noting that the source of the
content is not affected, and the de-listing only takes place for name queries. In addition, he
pointed out that the RTBF can only be exercised by the affected individual in relation to his
personal data and cannot affect historical events, and the application of the RTBF requires that
the interests of Internet users in access to the information is properly taken into account, which
should guarantee that if these interests should override the interests of the individual in delisting, the request should not be granted.
Fourth, Moulin clarified the CNIL’s point of view with respect to the extraterritorial effect of delistings, specifically its view that de-listings, when granted, should be granted on all global and
local versions of a search engine service. He asserted that the purpose of European law is not to
dictate which information Internet users outside of Europe can and cannot find on the Internet,
but simply to ensure that the fundamental right to data protection is respected by companies
falling under European jurisdiction. Because everything the Google search engine does with data
should be considered a single “processing” under the law, individuals’ rights to prevent such
processing cannot be limited to a single national version of the search service. Nor can a data
subject’s fundamental rights vary depending on who is looking at the information.

As French privacy regulators see it, an individual’s fundamental right to
privacy cannot vary depending on who is looking at the information, or where
the viewer is located.

In the discussion with the other panelists and the audience that followed, Moulin was asked
whether the question of extraterritorial application might involve a more nuanced assessment,
including for instance consideration of whether the information would have a potential
international readership, where the speaker and his main audience were located, etc. In response
to this question, Moulin suggested that it may not be CNIL’s primary aim to provide the most
nuanced substantive interpretation of how to apply the RTBF. Instead, CNIL’s chief aim would
be to establish, in court, that it has the power to require a global de-listing, when relevant, in its
dealings with an international Internet company such as Google. Thus, for CNIL, the legal
settlement of its global jurisdictional reach as regards internationally operating data controllers
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appears more important than the proper settlement of individual RTBF requests and balancing of
privacy and freedom of expression, also in a global perspective. The RTBF context may simply
present an attractive opportunity for CNIL to settle these matters under European law.
While this may come as no surprise to some, the respect for diverging regional norms, and the
collateral damage for globally operating search engines and the free speech interests of Internet
users, including in Europe, do seem to warrant a more careful approach to this question of
extraterritorial reach. In addition, how workable is such an approach in practice? How can the
principle of judicial restraint in cases of overlapping and competing jurisdictional claims reinform the debate about the proper enforcement of data protection as regards search engines? It
was clear during the panel, and remains clear today, that the last word has not yet been spoken
about these issues.
As mentioned, the panel took a global perspective on the RTBF, representing the French
perspective, discussed above, comparative perspectives from academic research, including from
Luiz Moncau who also spoke about developments related to the RTBF in the Americas,
specifically. Moncau furthered the point that a global discussion about the RTBF requires
conceptual clarity and an understanding of the legal systems in which developments are
emerging. Are RTBF claims data protection law related, or emerging in other areas of law? Is the
RTBF a right with respect to the historical record? Is it a right to get certain information erased,
or only to get information de-listed from search engines? From a legal perspective, what is put
forward as the basis for a RTBF? A right to one’s personal information online? A right to the
protection of one’s reputation and dignity as a person? Moncau discussed a number of RTBF
related cases in the Americas, ranging from cases in Mexico and Peru that were similar to the
cases in the EU targeting search engines on the basis of data protection law, to cases in Brazil,
where no data protection exists and something like a RTBF exists in the context of republication
of information about criminal convictions.
Moncau ended his presentation with his answer to the question of clashing jurisdictional
approaches. Specifically, he argued that jurisdictional caution is warranted, as he does not see
any growing acceptance of countries letting other countries restrict the free flow of information
on the Internet in their territory. And indeed, a future in which a European global or extraterritorial application of their RTBF would affect access to information of Internet users in the
United States clearly runs counter to commitments to freedom of expression in the US, including
search companies operating from the US. Even if the CNIL were successful in convincing
European courts that Google must de-list search results globally, instead of merely for localized
versions in Europe, this could hardly be expected to settle the matter. One could even imagine
those services affected seeking remedies in the United States to protect them against such
jurisdictional overreach on the basis of the First Amendment.
Joris van Hoboken (responsible for preparing this report) discussed the RTBF from the
perspective of different approaches to intermediary liability for online platforms. First, he
clarified that the RTBF emerged in the void that was left by the Ecommerce Directive with
respect to secondary liability for search engines, because the Directive establishes no specific
safe harbor for information location tools. This void is important given the clear impact that
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search engines, and searches for people’s names in particular, can have on people’s privacy and
reputation. As European intermediary liability law did not provide for a clear answer to the
liability of search engines for such harms, data protection and data protection regulators were
able to step into this void and address this legal (right to effective remedy) and societal demand.
Second, van Hoboken clarified that categorical approaches to intermediary liability, such as the
absolute immunity provided for in US law under CDA 230, are not sustainable under
fundamental rights requirements in Europe. He, apparently provocatively for some in the
audience, put forward the argument that CDA 230’s absolute immunity would clearly violate the
right to an effective remedy under the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU
Charter. He also maintained that one typical argument—that certain types of obligations on
intermediaries do not scale very well—does not carry the weight in European courts that some
might want it to carry, as it runs counter to the general requirement that justice be done in
individual cases, especially where the protection of fundamental rights is concerned. In view of
these characteristics of the European legal environment, he recommended that relevant US-based
services do much more to embrace the complexity (and diversity) of the European environment
to arrive at a more sustainable model of intermediary liability for privacy and reputational harms.
Finally, van Hoboken raised some points with respect to the CNIL case about global de-listings.
He argued that generally, in his view, CNIL does not have a very strong legal case, based on the
CJEU ruling, the Data Protection Directive and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A central
argument for the global de-listing order is that otherwise, the de-listing is not effective. However,
the question of what legal enforcement is appropriate should be answered in relation to the
underlying goals of the enforcement, namely to prevent a disproportionate impact on the right to
privacy through name searches. Thus, the goal of granting a RTBF request is not to prevent
access to the material entirely. This implies that leaving certain channels open, including what
could be considered extraterritorial channels, can be consistent with the EU RTBF itself, as long
as those channels do not pose a disproportionate impact on the fundamental right to privacy.
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Human Rights
Summary by Agustina Del Campo

Panelists:


Agustina Del Campo - Director, Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression and
Access to Information CELE at Universidad de Palermo



Jason Pielemeier - Special Advisor and Section Lead, Internet Freedom, Business and
Human Rights, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of
State



Paul Schabas - Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto

From the Agenda:
Rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are supposed to be
just that: universal. Human rights litigators have in some cases sought redress in one
country’s courts for harms in another; they are also often on the forefront in opposing
national court orders that conflict with free expression and other fundamental rights.
How does human rights law affect outcomes when different countries prioritize different
rights—such as privacy or free expression? What unique issues are posed by human
rights law for cross-border orders regulating online speech?

************
Without a doubt, human rights law provides an important framework for the discussion of crossborder speech regulation. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in
Article 19 clearly states the right to express opinions and ideas “regardless of frontiers” and the
Internet is a particularly relevant tool and platform for the exercise of this right, both in its
individual and social dimensions. There was a common underlying basic agreement among the
different panelists as to the need to include a human rights perspective in content removal
discussions, whether judicial, regulatory or legislative.
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International human rights instruments expressly protect people’s rights to
express opinions and ideas “regardless of frontiers.”

The three panelists shared the view that human rights law may and should contribute to
determinations of cross-border speech regulation as well as content regulation and Internet
regulation more broadly.
Paul Schabas presented first with a call for judicial attention to the principles of comity and
proportionality. As an experienced media rights attorney and author to the amicus curiae brief
submitted by the organizations Article 19 and Human Rights Watch, among other organizations,
in the Equustek case—before the Supreme Court of Canada, he argued for the need to bring
Article 19 of the ICCPR as a framework and structure to disputes involving or potentially
implicating cross-border content removals.3
While comity was first understood as the need to respect and fulfill foreign judgments in other
jurisdictions, after the libel tourism cases that put the US and Great Britain at odds in their
interpretation of the right to freedom of expression vis a vis the right to reputation, a new
understanding of comity arose. The new notion of comity, Schabas argued, is based on respect
for different jurisdictions and their different understandings of the law. This new understanding
in turn, brought judges, in Canada at least, to refer to judicial restraint in cases of cross border
speech regulation. And this is precisely the basis for the argument in the Equustek amicus brief.
In Equustek, like in the French Data Protection Authority’s global de-listing decision on the
“Right to Be Forgotten,” Schabas suggested that the Courts in Canada are overreaching their
own jurisdiction, extending it beyond their borders. And like the Google Spain “Right to be
Forgotten” case,4 there is no mention of the principle of proportionality to frame the reasoning
for the decision-making process. As Schabas, and Article 19 and Human Rights Watch argued,
there is a need to look at content removal orders from the standpoint of international human
rights law, particularly Article 19 of the ICCPR. And while Article 19 has exceptions, limited
and narrowly tailored, it is for the States to interpret and balance them within a range of
interpretation consistent with the ICCPR. Where one State interprets a universal right in a
manner that is permissible within the “margin of appreciation,” other States should respect that
interpretation and not seek to impose their own, different understanding of the right. There is a
recognition that we have common values that need to be balanced per the proportionality test,
taking into account the impact on free expression, the impact on intermediaries, the efficacy of a
decision, etc. And there is also a need to take comity into account, bearing in mind that if Canada

3

Brief of Human Rights Watch, Article 19, Open Net (Korea), Software Freedom Law Centre and Center
for Technology and Society, Google v. Equustek, available at https://cisstatic.law.stanford.edu/cis/downloads/HRW Equustek.pdf.
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European Court of Justice, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
Case C-131/12, May 13, 2014.
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adopts an overreaching decision and expects it to be complied with, other States, including those
not respectful of human rights, may do the same and expect Canada to execute their decisions.
Next in order, Jason Pielemeier, speaking in his personal capacity, described three fact patterns
that frame important challenges for policy makers.
The first fact pattern was that of the Kidane v. Ethiopia case, where a foreign government, using
commercially available tools, is alleged to have illegally accessed the personal computers of a
US citizen. The attack was allegedly triggered by Mr. Kidane’s vocal and organized opposition
to the hacking government, the government of Ethiopia. The case is being appealed after a
District of Columbia district court decided the Wiretap Act doesn’t create a right of action
against a foreign State in US courts.5
The second fact pattern concerned a State-directed cyber-attack against a company physically
located in the US in retaliation for an act of expression considered offensive. The facts coincided
with the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack, which the US attributes to the government of North
Korea.
The third fact pattern related to a sophisticated and novel form of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDOS) attack against Github attributed by cybersecurity experts to the Chinese government in
April of 2015. The fact pattern involved the planting of malicious code into email traffic to direct
it to unwittingly attack websites which hosted content that would otherwise be censored by the
attacking government.
Each fact pattern, as explained by Pielemeier, clearly restricts the free flow of information.
However, calling them human rights violations, particularly under the ICCPR, would imply that
the ICCPR applies extraterritorially (outside of areas under the responsible government’s
“territory and jurisdiction”), which runs against the official position of the United States and
some other governments. The US government does not recognize the extraterritoriality of the
ICCPR and interprets Article 2 narrowly. Article 2.1 states “Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.” The US government understands the ICCPR to apply only to
people who are within its territory AND, rather than OR, under their jurisdiction. Some other
governments and regional courts apply an “effective control” test to determine where jurisdiction
may exist outside of a country’s territory but it is unclear whether “effective control” could be
established in any of the illustrative fact patterns.
If human rights law doesn’t attach to the fact patterns described, then it is harder to conceptualize
their relationship to existing norms and expectations, as well as to justify appropriate responses.
The lack of an appropriate response could in turn create an incentive for the recurrence and
multiplicity of such attacks. Pielemeier concluded by explaining that the US government is
working with other governments to develop a broader set of norms for state conduct in
5

The appeals court later affirmed this ruling. Kidane. V. Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 7 (2017).
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cyberspace during peace time, and has on occasions called out these attacks as against existing
norms but has stopped short of calling them human rights violations per se.
Finally, the third speaker Agustina Del Campo focused on the framework provided by the InterAmerican system for the protection of human rights and what that framework may contribute
towards the cross-border regulation of speech dilemma. The presentation started by describing
the very strong protections that the American Convention and the Inter-American jurisprudence
have set forth for the region. In the Inter-American system prior censorship is expressly
prohibited and limitations may only be legitimate in the form of subsequent liability and
following the three part test: legality, necessity and proportionality. Most of the cases heard by
the Inter-American Court arise from violations caused by the judiciary in their interpretation of
the balancing test, and pivot around proportionality issues. The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has set particularly strong standards to protect public interest expression, expression
related to public officials or candidates, and speech related to human rights violations.
Having set the basic framework for the protection of freedom of expression, Del Campo
described the framework for reparations developed by the Court in an effort to assess if and how
they may affect content removal and cross-border speech regulation. International law dictates
that a breach of international law carries a duty to repair it. The UN Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
propose four different means to repair human rights violations: restitution, compensation,
satisfaction and measures of non-repetition.
The preferred means of reparation for the Inter-American Court is restitution. And it has ordered
restitution in a number of freedom of expression cases, ordering both the production, the
suppression and the restitution of information to its original format. The case of Ivcher Bronstein
vs. Peru,6 for example, concerned indirect restriction to freedom of expression—whereby Mr.
Ivcher was deprived of his nationality in order to strip him of his rights and of shares he owned
in a television network as retaliation for his editorial line. The Court ordered that the shares be
returned to him. In Herrera vs. Costa Rica7 and Canese vs. Paraguay,8 two cases of
disproportionate criminal defamation convictions, the Court found violations of freedom of
expression and ordered the State to annul the convictions and exclude them from the defendants’
criminal records. In Herrera, the Inter-American Court also reversed the domestic court’s order
requiring an online newspaper to link to that court’s judgment. In most of its cases, whether on
freedom of expression or not, the Court has also ordered that its decision be published in a
government website for at least a year and at least once in a widely distributed national
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InterAmerican Court H.R., February 6, 2001, Series C No. 74, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_74_esp.pdf.
7 InterAmerican Court H.R., July 2, 2004, Series C No. 107, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_107_ing.pdf.
8 InterAmerican Court H.R., August 31, 2004, Series C. No. 111, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_111_ing.pdf.
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newspaper. And in the cases of Manuel Cepeda Vargas9 and Gomez Lund,10 the Court ordered
that a documentary be produced to remember the victims and their particular contributions to
their respective fields.
Per the jurisprudence cited to, in Del Campo’s terms, there is broad protection of freedom of
expression and a duty, once a violation is declared, to repair it effectively. Whenever possible,
reparation should be through restitutio in integrum, which in some cases may entail the
production and/or suppression of information. In this context, issues that may require further
attention include: Under the strict test that the Inter-American system developed to protect free
speech, what would a declaration of a violation to this right entail in terms of reparation? If upon
a finding of a human rights violation, content is ordered to be produced, reinstated or removed,
what should the scope for such an order be to comply with “restitution”?
Upon the panel finalizing their presentations there were a number of questions posed, starting
with the conference hostess, Daphne Keller: A panel earlier mentioned a sort of arms race
between geoblocking and circumvention and potential legal consequences for those utilizing and
producing circumvention tools abroad. The US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor (DRL) has been financing the development and dissemination of tools that
allow people to circumvent censorship. How is DRL dealing with the issues? And to the rest of
the panel, are there human rights-based arguments to support the legality of the tools for
circumvention? Particularly how does the “regardless of frontiers” language work?
Pielemeier confirmed that an important part of DRL’s work includes supporting the development
of circumvention tools to counter censorship. However, the case has not arisen where an
organization that DRL was financing was found liable for that circumvention work. Still, he did
agree with prior panelists that it’s an important issue that could need to be addressed in the near
future.
Going to the nature of geoblocking, Schabas manifested his concern as to the limitations that
geoblocking poses to information seekers and the lack of effectiveness of such tools. He went on
to describe, without naming, the case of a famous couple, where one was English and the other
Canadian, who litigated in England seeking to geoblock certain content pertaining to them and
eventually sought to implement such geoblocking in Canada as well. Per the example, he
concluded, it would be very hard for different countries to agree on how to balance rights and
there should be room to respect each other’s decisions.
Professor Lea Shaver contributed an interesting question: we keep talking about comity,
reciprocity and judicial restraint. However, the fact that we respect other’s decisions doesn’t
necessarily mean that they will respect ours and vice-versa, or in the same kinds of cases. So, she
asked, is it a zero-sum game, where it’s all or nothing? Should there be rules on when

9

InterAmerican Court H.R., May 26, 2010, Series C No. 213, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_213_ing.pdf.
10 InterAmerican Court H.R., November 24, 2010, Series C No. 219, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_219_ing.pdf.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction should be acceptable and when it shouldn’t? What lines could be
drawn for when content should be removed cross-borders or not?
Among the panelists, some considered that human rights norms were not that clear and human
rights conventions have built in flexibility that challenge their universal application for these
disputes. The lack of a universal court that could eventually resolve these issues came up as an
issue that adds to the argument. However, others considered that the interpretations and
guidelines of the different human rights supervisory bodies are not that different and may
provide an underlying basis for the discussion. The issue remains, though, as to how to deal with
States that are not a party to any human rights treaty?

Might human-rights-respecting States agree not to apply their laws
extraterritorially, when the remedy granted in one State would violate human
rights as understood by the other?

Ambassador Eileen Donahoe then asked: Among those that have agreed with the ICCPR, could
human rights law provide a minimal bottom line? Can/should a regime be created for rightsrespectful States, whereby per some basic rules, no extraterritorial application will be allowed if
the remedy sought implies a violation of a human right per the understanding of another?
Pielemeier addressed the question and noted that one possible basis for determining when
national law should apply extraterritorially could be the distinction in human rights law between
“gross” and ordinary violations. He warned that certain decisions and standards, regardless of the
jurisdictional reach, posed issues and concerns, like the “Right to Be Forgotten” decisions. These
kinds of decisions generate dangerous precedents for countries looking for excuses to censor
speech. Still, some norms can be developed among rights-respecting States and there are efforts
underway already, like those being produced through the Freedom Online Coalition, that are
moving in that direction. With that, the panel ended.
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Mutual Legal Assistance and Law Enforcement
Access to User Data
Summary by Albert Gidari
Watch Video

Panelists:


Albert Gidari - Director of Privacy, Stanford Center for Internet and Society



Jennifer Granick - Director of Civil Liberties, Stanford Center for Internet and Society



Nathaniel Jones - Assistant General Counsel, Microsoft



Andrew Woods - Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law

From the Agenda:
Lawyers and activists concerned with law enforcement, surveillance and privacy have
long debated the rules that should govern cross-border requests for Internet platforms to
disclose user data to law enforcement. The Microsoft Ireland case and mutual legal
assistance treaty (MLAT) and Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) reform
discussions in the US have added new urgency to this issue. Do lessons and insights
from that discussion help us to think through the cross-border content regulation issues
raised in this conference? How should the debate over cross-border data requests be
informed by a broader understanding of the problems of international content
regulation?

************
The Law, Borders, and Speech conference at Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society asked the
important question: Which countries’ laws and values will govern Internet users’ online
behavior, including their free expression rights? The conference used the landmark article
written in 1996 by David G. Post and David R. Johnson to examine whether twenty years on
their conclusions still held true. Post and Johnson had concluded that “[t]he rise of the global
computer network is destroying the link between geographical location and: (1) the power of
local governments to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects of online behavior on
individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of the efforts of a local sovereign to enforce rules
applicable to global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which
sets of rules apply.” They proposed that national law must be reconciled with self-regulatory
processes emerging from the network itself.
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The conference panels addressed how we reconcile differences in national laws governing
speech today, and asked how we should be reconciling them; what are the responsibilities of
Internet speakers and platforms when faced with diverging rules about what online content is
legal; and whether users have relevant legal rights when their speech, or the information they are
seeking, is legal in their own country. For those interested in content regulation and intermediary
liability issues, these topics are well-traveled and often discussed, but the conference added a
panel on law enforcement access to user data—a topic that raises many of the same jurisdictional
and prudential concerns as the assertion of power to remove or regulate content globally but
which is seldom discussed in the same breath or in the same room as content regulation.
The goal of the panel was to look at the current practices and procedures of sovereigns
demanding access to user data, and how providers respond to such legal demands, to glean any
lessons applicable to the content regulation world.
The discussion opened with the observation that there is a century or more of established
practices and procedure that is territorially-based for cross border evidence gathering. Our
existing treaties and conventions all recognize the doctrine of territoriality when it comes to
evidence gathering. That is, one country doesn’t seize evidence from within the borders of
another country without the searched country’s permission and cooperation. From that simple
principle arose mutual legal assistance treaties and international procedures for procuring
evidence abroad that stood the test of time—until the Internet broke them.
No doubt, the rise of the Internet, Internet platforms, social networks and cloud computing has
created significant problems for law enforcement (LE). It is obvious, really—the victim of a
crime of fraud may be local, but the perpetrator is likely in one or more countries using one or
more access providers to get online and one or more applications to commit the fraud. The
evidence of the crime and the perpetrators are likely outside the victim’s place of residence,
presumably the locus of the crime. This is not unlike the most difficult content regulation
problems where the content may be hosted in one country, where it is legally displayed by a
publisher located in a second country where it is legal to speak the content, but the party harmed
by the content is located in a third country where there is no practical remedy under that nation’s
laws.
There are international processes in place for LE to obtain evidence of the crime or to identify
the perpetrators, but it is acknowledged that these avenues are at best cumbersome, slow,
bureaucratic and inefficient. Going directly to providers in other countries does not work—most
of the providers of interest have historically been in the US, but increasingly that is not the only
case. The US, like most countries, has blocking statutes that prohibit disclosure of content other
than to domestic government authorities. And post-Snowden, even if there was previously room
for voluntary cooperation, that door has closed. This gives rise to frustration for the investigatory
agencies as the evidence often is necessary or fundamental to prosecution.
But just as with content regulation, LE is not sitting on its hands waiting for international law to
develop to solve the problem. Instead, we see the extraterritorial assertion of power to compel
disclosures by providers located abroad. Law enforcement agencies, sometimes assisted by local
courts, assert power and demand cooperation from providers—including by asserting that a
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global platform is using facilities within the country by merely having a service that is accessible
and therefore actually “within the jurisdiction,” arresting employees who are present in the
jurisdiction, and even blocking access to service to force cooperation.
In short, these agencies act extraterritorially. This is not a problem just for requests coming from
outside the US, affecting only US providers. US law can also be the source of extraterritorial
demands in other countries. Amendments to Rule 41 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure would
permit a warrant to issue from any US court to remotely access a computer where its location is
unknown. The same issue exists under the Cybercrime Convention. Article 32b of the
Convention is an exception to the principle of territoriality and permits unilateral transborder
access without the need for mutual assistance under limited circumstances. Rule 32b permits LE
to access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in
the territory of another Party, if LE obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who
has the lawful authority to disclose the data to LE through that computer system.
Some countries have also acted locally. They require data localization to facilitate lawful access
to user information. Russia has been very aggressive of late in requiring local storage of data by
online providers, but even local storage solutions are not ideal or fully effective—not all users
whose data might be subject to local storage reside within the country for example. What choice
or notice will those users have when corresponding or interacting with a user where localization
applies?

Providers cannot be in the position of deciding daily which nation’s laws are
going to be broken in responding or not responding to legal demands.

The current system of mutual legal assistance treaties is inadequate to the task and in need of
reform. Providers cannot be in the position of deciding daily which nation’s laws are going to be
broken in responding or not responding to legal demands. Not all providers can rely on the kind
of argument raised by Microsoft in its ongoing case against DOJ—that data stored in Ireland
can’t be compelled for production on US process served on a US provider where the process
lacks extraterritorial application.11
But legal victories based on territorial limitations of the sovereign’s power may in the long run
be a “log on the fire” of data localization. Governments will not be deprived of the evidence
necessary to investigate and prosecute crimes, and the lack of an effective system to balance the
needs of users, platforms and government agencies may yield worse precedents.
It is interesting to think about technology as a solution to the “problem”—such as the use of
encryption for stored content. But governments see such “solutions” as obstruction of justice,
11

Microsoft Ireland: In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corporation 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), reh'g en banc denied, No. 14-2985,
2017 WL 362765 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2017).
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just as they see claims of jurisdictional protection by providers as avoidance of responsibility.
Government mandates in the end can affect the lawfulness of the technology just as they can
affect the disclosure of the data. As one panelist noted, “jurisdiction is a hack” to solid
encryption, but that doesn’t mean that technology should be ignored as a solution.
Just as with content regulation, interoperability among differing legal systems, and not
harmonization, may be the more desirable goal. But at what cost to which principles? Probable
cause and free speech in the US are values not shared globally, nor are they values that always
trump other valid concerns of other sovereign interests.

National law affirmatively obliges Internet companies to protect users’ privacy
against foreign law enforcement demands in some cases. By contrast, a
company facing a foreign content removal demand almost never has legal
obligations to protect users’ speech rights.

Over the course of presentations and conversation, panelists identified a number of points that
may distinguish cross-border LE requests for user data from cross-border content removal
demands.


Legal obligations: National law affirmatively obliges Internet companies to protect users’
privacy including against foreign LE requests in some cases, potentially creating a
conflict with the law of the country whose LE is seeking the data. Under MLAT
agreements, this situation may arise where the act under investigation is a crime in the
LE’s country, but not in the company’s. By contrast, a company facing a foreign content
removal demand almost never has legal obligations to protect speech rights of users, and
thus is free to comply with the request even in cases where the speech is protected under
the company’s national law.



Sources of law: LE requests for user data are governed by long-established—if
increasingly archaic—laws and treaties governing data disclosure, and establishing
territoriality as a governing principle. No comparable history or source of law exists for
content removal.



Available information: Companies may have to respond to LE requests without knowing
for sure where the data sits, what the user’s nationality is, or where the user may be
physically located. Content removal requests rarely arise in such an informational
vacuum.



Technological differences: Tools like geoblocking may permit companies to comply with
content removal demands on one nationally-targeted version of their service, while
keeping the content available in other countries. Such territorially limited compliance
does not have an analog in the LE context.
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Risk: While both LE data requests and content removal requests can affect Internet users’
human rights, the worst case scenario for improper data disclosure—wrongful arrest and
abuse of innocent people—may be considerably worse.

At the same time, the panelists identified a number of areas of similarity.


Centralization exacerbates conflicts: As online information is increasingly processed by a
relatively small number of intermediaries, these companies become chokepoints for
information control and centralized repositories of data about user activity. These
companies and the governments of their home countries will face increasing pressure to
reach accommodations with governments around the world, both for content removal and
user data disclosure.



Lack of public information: The processes followed by companies in response to both
kinds of requests are relatively opaque to the public, and may be unknown even to the
affected user.



Political consequences of non-compliance: Companies rejecting or disregarding foreign
legal demands of both sorts risk offending government actors in those countries. The
resulting political fall-out, such as data localization requirements, may harm both the
Internet companies and their users.



Courts are the wrong forum: Resolving these complex issues through litigation is unlikely
to lead to sound policy solutions. Not all affected parties or interests will likely be heard,
and parties must shape their arguments to existing, flawed law—rather than promoting
more sensible balances that might be achieved through legislation or treaty negotiation.

Perhaps in the end there are more similarities between content regulation and cross-border
evidence demands than practitioners in both areas might have imagined. The jurisdictional
questions are largely the same; the pressures on platforms to be solution providers is enormous;
and government frustration with provider push-back is the same in both worlds. It seems clear to
those that deal with cross-border evidence collection that in the absence of an agreed upon
international framework with safeguards to permit lawful access to data, more and more
countries will take unilateral action and extend law enforcement powers to remote transborder
searches either formally or informally with unclear safeguards. The same is true with content
regulation.
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Black Letter Law
Summary by Dan Jerker B. Svantesson

Panelists:


Amy Keating - Senior Legal Director, Twitter



Uta Kohl - Senior Lecturer, Aberystwyth School of Law, Aberystwyth University



Lea Bishop Shaver - Professor of Law at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law



Dan Svantesson - Professor and Co-Director, Centre for Commercial Law, Faculty of
Law, Bond University, Australia

From the Agenda:
Black letter jurisdiction law can seem poorly suited to the questions that face courts in
cases about global content deletion. What legal doctrine should courts apply to grapple
with concerns about a “lowest common denominator” Internet, subject to every
country’s speech prohibitions? Which institutions of national government should help
shape these laws? Are laws from a company’s home country—such as the DMCA for US
companies, or Russia’s anti-LGBT laws for Russian ones—uniquely able to compel
global content deletion from those platforms?

************
The topic of how well the tool of black letter law works in the Internet law setting is of course
huge, and associated with obvious definitional challenges. To point to but one; how ought we
define “black letter law” in our present legal culture where legal rules necessarily must take
account of the technical reality in which they operate? Indeed, given Wikipedia’s definition of
“black letter laws” as laws that are “the well-established technical legal rules that are no longer
subject to reasonable dispute,” one may legitimately question whether we can speak of any real
black letter law within our field of enquiry. Fortunately, however, the panel was asked to
approach only the more concrete topic identified in the description above.
As the organizers no doubt had predicted, the angles adopted by the presenters were diverse,
which sparked a fruitful and vibrant discussion, both amongst the panel members and with the
broader audience. To truly do justice to the richness of the discussion would necessitate a
transcript being produced.
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Here, my humble aim is to bring attention to a selection of particularly interesting topics that
were discussed. Thus, I am seeking to reflect the discussion rather than merely my own personal
views on the topics discussed.

Even in our brave new technology-driven world, black letter law cannot
be ignored
With the powerful regulatory influence of technology, we have been made to realize that black
letter law certainly has its limits. There is no point in denying this, and useful models have been
developed illustrating that law is just one part of a bigger regulatory picture. However, it is
perhaps the case that, at least in the past, we have underestimated the power of black letter law,
in that we have overestimated the impact of difficulties of enforcing judgments across borders.
Our focus has been on the idea that States need the cooperation of foreign States to have their
judgments enforced in those foreign States, and since the underlying structure for such
cooperation generally is weak, lacking cross-border enforcement mechanisms undermines the
role of black letter law.
The problem with this reasoning is that it focuses on foreign enforcement of extraterritorial
claims, overlooking the power of domestic enforcement of extraterritorial claims. Courts and
other bodies (such as Data Protection Authorities) are increasingly determined to impose their
laws on Internet conduct, and the reality is that there are many different types of “market
destroying measures” they can take domestically to achieve an impact extraterritorially. To see
that this is so, one need only consider the number of instances where States have shut down, in
their territories, entire platforms operated from abroad. Overall, this is a harmful trend
characterized by excessive State responses. However, one can easily imagine less draconian
“market destroying measures” being applied. Thus, applied appropriately, and in a measured,
proportionate manner, the underlying jurisdictional idea of States exercising “market
sovereignty” over the market they control is much preferable to the biggest threat to the
Internet—inappropriate global blocking/deletion orders.
At any rate, one key point here—for our context—is that when speaking of law, as in black letter
law, we need to acknowledge that law has teeth and can, most of the time, not be ignored.

Black letter law fails to provide sufficient certainty
While we can conclude that black letter law still matters, and is likely to continue to matter, we
must also acknowledge that black letter law often fails to provide sufficient certainty; and this is
particularly noticeable in the context of fast-moving information technology. If we also consider
that the law often “outsources” decision-making powers to technology companies, the scale and
scope of the problems associated with this uncertainty becomes clear.
For individuals, the problem is obviously manifested in that their rights may not be adequately
protected. For the governments, this problem undermines their authority as well as their
efficiency as regulators. Finally, for the technology companies, the problem is that they are
placed in the unenviable position of being asked to interpret and apply unclear laws. And every
decision they make in their interpretation and application of those unclear laws may
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subsequently be scrutinized by courts or authorities and be held to be mistaken, subjecting them
to penalties and bad press.
Law makers, including courts, must do more to achieve clear and predictable laws that at the
same time are sufficiently flexible; a great challenge no doubt, but this must nevertheless be the
aim.

Inappropriate global blocking/deletion orders
Where the laws of, let us say, France are only affecting what can be accessed online in France,
there is a clear link between the State’s coercive power and the effect of that power being
exercised. One of the biggest challenges today is that too often courts and other bodies do not
seek to play within such limits. There is a tendency to require global de-listing or blocking for
just about every violation of local law. Of course, global blocking has a role to play for some
types of content (such as child pornography materials), but not as a default position for every
violation of local law.
Courts need to be much more careful. To address this, we need to pay much more attention to
what we may refer to as “scope of jurisdiction”. In addition to talking about personal jurisdiction
and subject matter jurisdiction, we should discuss scope of jurisdiction, as in the question of
what is the appropriate geographical scope of orders rendered by a court that has personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction?
Courts must realize that there is a correlation between the strength of their claim for personal
jurisdiction and the legitimacy of the scope of jurisdiction, as in the geographical scope of the
remedy they order. And in fact, for example in EU law we can already see scope of jurisdiction
being clearly discussed as a matter of jurisdiction.
However, this may obviously also be characterized as a problem that falls within the area of
remedies law. While jurisdiction and choice of law issues address these questions at the
beginning of a lawsuit, remedies law approach them at the end of the litigation, when damages
and injunctions are set.

Jurisdiction and choice of law analysis addresses questions about online speech
and borders at the beginning of a lawsuit. Remedies law can do so at the end,
when damages and injunctions are set.

It is a principle of remedies law that injunctive relief must be appropriately tailored, which can
include geographic tailoring. After finding a violation and deciding that equitable relief is
warranted, a court ought to explicitly consider whether its injunction should apply only to the
particular party, to a single office, or more broadly. The choice of remedies thus offers another
opportunity for lawyers to argue that a court's exercise of authority should be geographically
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limited. In this context, it is important to explore the principles underlying the norm of limited
injunctive relief, and how these might be applied to online activity that crosses national borders.
We ought to move past the substantive issues, and even the choice of remedies issue of whether
an injunction will be appropriate, to think deeply about the range of possible forms that this
injunction might take. Because at the end of the day, who wins matters, but what matters even
more is what the court is going to do about it. How broadly will the court's order be designed?
Prohibiting (or compelling) exactly what conduct? For how long? Where? These are questions of
injunctive scope. Attorneys should be thinking about these questions from the very beginning of
litigation. Some of these possibilities will be acceptable to your client. Others will not be
acceptable. It can be a disaster if the judge drafts an injunction uninformed by your arguments as
to what scope is appropriate. On the other hand, if you have in mind what you want that
injunction to say (even if you lose) you can advance arguments from the very beginning to limit
the damage. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that companies litigating online speech issues
ought to think carefully about injunctive scope as part of their strategy. And arguments about
diverging values on freedom of expression and privacy, and the technicalities of global takedown
can help push courts to draft a more narrowly framed injunction when they feel they need to
order some kind of restriction on speech.
Thus, this is clearly a problem where remedies experts and jurisdiction experts need to work
together.

The impact of cultural differences
The important impact of cultural differences has already been hinted at in the above. More
broadly, however, it can be argued that legal solutions are not necessarily the best ones (which
admittedly undermines the role to be played by black letter law). This is exemplified in that,
arguably, the most challenging conflicts today are not merely between tech companies and
governments, or between different governments, but between user groups that are increasingly
polarized; that content issues are increasingly not about what is legal, but about what is
acceptable or civil. And as users are global, they have different views.
Perhaps we can prevent some of these problems from coming to court if there is greater humility
and sensitivity to differing values. This debate still contains echoes of John Perry Barlow’s
cyberanarchy sentiment that the Internet ought to be immune from regulation. This is perhaps
rooted in a uniquely American sentiment of "sticks and stones may break my bones, but names
will never hurt me."
It is troubling to some that so many Americans in this space take it as a point of pride to refuse to
seriously entertain European sensibilities about (data) privacy and Holocaust denial. Or the
social context for Indian blasphemy law also alluded to during the conference. Is this principled
leadership in the defense of universal values, or a Silicon Valley parochialism? For companies
who bear the social responsibility for Internet freedom worldwide, it is essential to be open to
"foreign" views on the appropriate scope of freedom of expression, to seriously consider them,
and to engage in a dialog with a spirit of humility and awareness of our own local perspectives.
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Many Americans take it as a point of pride to refuse to seriously entertain
European sensibilities about privacy and Holocaust denial, or the social context
for Indian blasphemy law. Is this principled leadership in the defense of
universal values, or Silicon Valley parochialism?

In this context, it should also be noted that, surrounding factors—such as how is the US seen,
and how is the relevant technology company in question perceived—influence whether courts
around the globe will seek to exercise jurisdiction over US technology companies. Thus, it is
possible that a general stronger willingness to accommodate foreign views—going beyond mere
legal compliance—will limit the risk of the relevant technology company being pursued by the,
often limited, enforcement resources of foreign states. At the same time, US technology
companies must obviously carefully evaluate whether the foreign cultural values in question are
so far detached from the company’s values so as to make it impossible to accommodate them. In
the latter case, they may conclude that it is best to entirely avoid the relevant market.
Finally on this, in devising a litigation strategy, US technology companies must be mindful of
the fact that, courts’ desires to allow local plaintiffs to litigate locally is closely linked to
conceptions of sovereignty. Thus, it may often be prudent to not only dispute jurisdiction, but to
also tackle the underlying substantive legal issue. Indeed, in some cases, it may be strategically
unwise to make what otherwise is a domestic dispute into a cross-border issue by disputing
jurisdiction where the company in question has a substantial presence on the relevant market.

The ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ in the online global order
It has been noted that territoriality and extraterritoriality are claims of authority, or of resistance
to such claims that are made by particular actors with particular substantive interests to promote.
Consequently, territoriality (or territoriality of law and order) is not a ‘natural’ state of affairs,
but a legal construction created to protect certain interests. Furthermore, however ill-suited it
may be for the global (online) market place (see further below), territoriality remains the norm or
the default standard for legitimate authority. Under this thinking, anything extraterritorial is
prima facie considered something ‘outside the norm’ and carries with it a strong whiff of
illegitimacy.
The presumption against extraterritoriality is applied by the judiciary to interpret legislation and
tells us that legislation applies to persons and matters within the territory of the state, but not to
persons and matters outside the territory, unless the legislation evinces a contrary intention. Even
though the presumption would appear to be highly pertinent in Internet cases—given that each
State’s regulation of online activity always has some extraterritorial effect—this principle has so
far figured very rarely in Internet cases.
In the standard Internet jurisdiction case, judges simply find that the foreign online content or
service provider has to comply with local law on the basis that a local injury is caused or a local
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interest is affected by the foreign actor or activity. This means that the law and its application to
the facts is either not treated as ‘extraterritorial’ at all (i.e., we are only regulating what occurs on
our territory) or alternatively, the presumption is displaced, based on the thinking that the law’s
territorial overreach is justified as a legislative effort that simply seeks to redress a domestic
injury caused by foreign conduct.
The most significant function of the presumption against extraterritoriality is that it advocates
caution and restraint in extraterritorial regulatory assertions, saying that in the vast majority of
cases it is inappropriate to extend the law and litigation to matters that lie outside the State’s
territory. Thus, the presumption is driven by the potential conflict of different laws and in
recognition of each nation’s sovereign authority and the desire for a harmonious global working
order.
Looking at cases such as various US cases from 1996, to LICRA v. Yahoo! in France in 200112
and Gutnick in Australia in 2002,13 to the recent Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack in Canada in
2014,14 it would appear that the desire for a harmonious global working order has been rather
limited amongst the courts to date. Typically too, the presumption against extraterritoriality is
displaced in three different ways by Article 3 of the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (entering into force in May 2018).
While on a technical legal level the result of this position signals the effective expiry of the
relevance of the presumption against extraterritoriality, in broader regulatory terms the
presumption reflects and embodies a global order based on state law. Where everybody regulates
everything (or at least in principle asserts the right to do so) or where a system of regulatory
allocation is entirely predicated of might over right (i.e. enforcement jurisdiction), its practical or
principled utility and efficacy is under threat. Where France does not just regulate France but
also the rest of the world and where this principle is extended to every other State, a State-based
system of law and order has broken down and lost its raison d'être. From a more close-up,
constructive perspective, the routine non-applicability or displacement of the presumption in
transnational Internet cases requires its re-thinking and a re-framing. Such re-thinking would aim
to reintroduce a measure of restraint and caution into competence assertions, so much so that not
every foreign online provider who has contacts with local residents is always exposed to local
law.

The problem of our focus on territoriality
Perhaps the biggest problem we have in black letter law is that our law on jurisdiction is
grounded in the territoriality principle—the territoriality principle is the jurisprudential core of
12

UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc. & Yahoo! France, T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000.
Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co Inc. [2002] HCA 56, available at
http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2002/HCA/56.
14 2015 BCCA 265, available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/CA/15/02/2015BCCA0265.htm. The
panel discussion predated the Canadian Supreme Court’s subsequent decision, which affirmed the
appellate ruling.
13

36

our thinking on jurisdiction. But it should not be. We all know that the territoriality thinking is a
bad fit for cyberspace, but it is also increasingly obvious that the territoriality principle is a bad
fit for the real world; just consider areas such as human rights law, environmental law, air law
and so on. So the good news, if it can be seen to be news, is that we do not need to show that
cyberspace is different; cyberspace is just one more illustration of the problems with the
territoriality principle as such.
One proposed alternative jurisprudential framework for our thinking on jurisdiction is for us to
focus on: substantial connection, legitimate interest and a balancing of interest. This has obvious
parallels with what you find in the US Restatements, and for example in the comity thinking, in
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, etc. Without exactly replicating any particular previous
doctrine this proposal builds on established thinking and should therefore be easier to digest.
Some people will say that this is all fine but what we really need are practical solutions, not
abstract theories. But what they then are missing is that where we apply a practical solution in a
difficult case, we are often forced to interpret that practical solution in light of our underlying
theoretical framework—in building terms, our theoretical framework is the foundation, and we
all know what happens if we build on a flawed or weak foundation, we get into trouble and that
is where we are now due to having built our jurisdictional thinking on the territoriality principle.
So only by starting with a new foundation for jurisdiction can we make sensible jurisdictional
rules for the Internet.

Concluding remarks
All that remains for me to do here is to again thank the organizers of this terrific event, and to, 20
years belatedly, congratulate Professor Johnson and Professor Post on writing such an interesting
article. There are few other articles that are equally deserving of sparking an event like this, and
unfortunately, too many of the concerns to which they brought our attention remain unresolved
today.
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Real Power, Real Outcomes, Realpolitik
Summary by Daphne Keller
Watch Video

Panelists:


Anupam Chander - Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis



Juniper Downs - Global Head of Policy, YouTube



Min Jiang - Associate Professor of Communication, UNC Charlotte; Secretariat
Member, Chinese Internet Research Conference



Peter Stern - Policy Manager, Facebook



Emma Llansó - Director, Free Expression Project, Center for Democracy & Technology

From the Agenda:
Sometimes, the most powerful forces shaping Internet content removal decisions don’t
come from the law. Companies’ own discretionary Terms of Service or Community
Guidelines often prohibit far more speech than the law does. How do these discretionary
rules relate to national law—do they effectively displace it? Does public pressure from
powerful countries, including their governments, shape content policies applied to
speech around the world? The Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner
has said that States exercise authority - and must respect limitations grounded in human
rights—when they pressure private Internet platforms to “voluntarily” remove content.
Is this really a legal issue, or only a political one?

************
This panel considered issues of national jurisdiction in relation to Internet platforms’ voluntary
content removal policies. These policies, typically set forth in Community Guidelines (CGs) or
similar documents, prohibit content based on the platforms’ own rules or values—regardless of
whether the content violates any law.
Content removal based on CGs can raise important questions about the overall power of
platforms to shape the information available to their users. Law Professor Anupam Chander
captured this concern well in his panel contribution, which discussed Facebook’s decisions to
remove widely supported legal content, such as breastfeeding images. Chander’s presentation
was titled, aptly, “Should Mark Decide?” Removals based on CGs complicate the relationship
between State and private power. Platforms typically set and enforce the same policies
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worldwide, meaning that users from different cultural backgrounds—Stockholm versus rural
India, for example—all operate under the same rules. This may flatten out regional differences in
law and culture, displacing local values about speech, privacy, sexuality, and other significant
topics.
At the same time, platforms’ willingness to remove users’ expression globally for violating CGs
can be a source of global leverage for powerful States, as panelist Emma Llansó of the Center for
Democracy and Technology pointed out. When governments convince a platform to ban or
support content under CGs, they effectively achieve global enforcement of their own national
norms, values, or laws.
In addition to Llansó and Chander, who provided framing observations, the panel included two
company representatives, Facebook’s Peter Stern and Google’s Juniper Downs. Both discussed
the platforms’ internal practices and decision-making with respect to CGs. Communications
Professor Min Jiang added a description of government practices constraining Internet content
within China—practices which may be increasingly common in the rest of the world as more
countries embrace a territorialized Internet.
The two company spokespeople, Downs and Stern, fleshed out internal thinking and processes
used in enforcing CGs. Stern noted that Facebook’s CGs are informed by law and human rights
principles, but not grounded in the specific laws of any country. Rather, both he and Downs
emphasized the companies’ own founding missions as a source of direction and purpose for their
policies. Both described extensive internal processes to set CGs standards, and discussed the
difficulty of balancing conventional broad free expression protections with what Downs called
the “freedom to belong.” As both she and Stern noted, if CGs permit unfettered speech by all
users, hostile or bullying voices may effectively prevent others from participating—which in
itself reduces the array of viewpoints voiced on the platform. Downs also discussed the
difference in policies for different Google products. For example, because completeness is
important in the Web Search and Maps products, CG removals are more rare than in more
community-oriented products like YouTube.
In an audience question, David G. Post pressed these speakers to consider alternatives to the
internal standard-setting process. Expanding on a recurring theme of the conference, he asked
about the potential for meaningful self-governance by the community of platform users. Might
they, rather than companies or States, be consulted and relied on in establishing CGs? Both
platform representatives talked about their existing efforts to listen to thought leaders and
ordinary users, and to look to civil society groups as a proxy for user perspectives. As Stern
pointed out, though, the diversity of users and preferences would make for a wide array of
input—likely leaving companies to decide CGs at the end of the day in any case.
Chander, too, raised more pointed questions about internal processes, focusing on the
enforcement of CGs. As an example, he identified Facebook’s decision not to remove a post
from then-candidate Donald Trump, which users had flagged as violating the company’s hate
speech policy. The company explained that the post would remain accessible because of its
newsworthiness. As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the decision came from CEO Mark
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Zuckerberg himself. This and similar decisions led one newspaper editor to call Zuckerberg “the
world’s most powerful editor.”
As Chander outlined, this power to shape available speech on a key Internet platform establishes
an odd relationship between privately created CGs and publicly enacted law. Conceived as a
Venn diagram, he said, this relationship could go one of three ways: CG could prohibit only a
subset of the speech prohibited by law; law could prohibit only a subset of the speech prohibited
by CG; or the circles representing law and CG rules could overlap—with each set of rules
prohibiting some content that the other permits. Pressures on platforms, governments, and
Internet users vary depending on this configuration.
The company representatives expanded on this relationship, discussing the role of law and CGs
in their internal practice. As described by Stern, national law becomes relevant to Facebook’s
content removal decisions only in cases where the law prohibits more speech than the CGs do.
The company’s first step is always to vet a removal request against the CGs. Only if the CGs do
not require removal does Facebook proceed to consider national laws—looking to questions like
the nature of the issuing authority, due process, and whether the order is directed to the creator of
the content. This is a rigorous process, he said. Where national law truly requires removal, the
company attempts to be “noisy” about compliance, and blocks the content only in that country.
Describing Google’s process, Downs emphasized that CG and legal removals follow separate
internal tracks. For national law violations, Google, too, removes content for specific countries
rather than the entire world.
Another question raised by Chander focused on the connection of CGs to civil law. In particular,
he asked whether CGs set forth in companies’ Terms of Service are binding contractual terms,
enforceable through civil litigation. As he noted, if national courts enforced CGs to mandate
removal of lawful content, this would create a troubling role for the law in delegitimizing and
prohibiting lawful speech. This function of the law would be particularly concerning if the risk of
civil damages led platforms to preemptively remove users’ posts. On the other hand, problems
might arise if the law prevented platforms from removing content based on their CGs. A key US
intermediary liability law, Communications Decency Act 230, was enacted precisely in order to
encourage platforms to take down content they deem inappropriate. As Chander explained,
Congress enacted the law in response to a case that effectively punished an early platform for
trying—but failing—to enforce CGs against offensive and defamatory speech. Fearing that the
ruling would discourage platforms from voluntarily removing offensive material, Congress
spelled out immunities for platforms that did so, as well as immunities for platforms that leave
user content online. As a result, Chander noted, US law would be unlikely to support either
mandatory CG “take-downs” or mandatory “leave-ups.”
An audience question tied this analysis to questions of jurisdiction and national legal difference.
If CGs are actually contractual provisions under platforms’ Terms of Service, does that mean
that CGs are subject to interpretation by national courts? As several speakers pointed out, the
Terms of Service themselves are drafted to preclude this outcome, reserving ultimate discretion
to the platforms. However, given national differences in consumer protection and contract law,
such reservations of authority may not be enforceable in all countries. Grounding CGs in the
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Terms of Service, and exposing them to national contract enforcement, could effectively
reintroduce local legal variation and undermine the global effect of CGs.
Turning from civil law to criminal law, Llansó walked the audience through the increasing
importance of CGs as a tool for national law enforcement. As she explained, counter-terrorism
police units known as “Internet Referral Units” (IRUs) have been established in some EU
countries and Interpol. IRUs review online content, identify material that is potentially terrorismrelated, and report it to platforms for removal based on the platforms’ CGs. One law enforcement
officer publicly noted that relying on CGs—and not national law—is advantageous, because it
allows police to seek removal of information that is not actually illegal.
As Llansó noted, IRUs have faced extensive criticism from civil society organizations. Many
question whether using State resources and power to silence lawful speech is appropriate—or
even consistent with constitutional and human rights of Internet users. Other critics have
expressed alarm about law enforcement relying on private enforcement by platforms to
effectively bypass national courts. When platforms resolve difficult questions about the balance
between speech rights and public safety, societies may miss out on the important public
conversations and policymaking needed to grapple with these very issues. Similar concerns arise,
Llansó noted, regarding another important recent development: the 2016 Hate Speech Code of
Conduct agreed on by the European Commission and four major platforms. As explained by
Llansó, the Code of Conduct requires platforms to prohibit violent or hateful content under their
CGs, and to accept removal requests on that basis. This too, she said, is an exercise of State
power that causes private actors to suppress lawful speech.
In Llansó’s analysis, even if much of the affected speech were actually unlawful, these programs
would still raise an issue of users’ rights to remedy and “oversight at scale.” Errors by law
enforcement or platforms are inevitable—but it is unclear what redress users have if the error
came from enforcement of discretionary CGs. Transparency about law enforcement and platform
removal efforts, and access to appellate review, are key to protecting users’ rights. Remedies
may be particularly important given the global scope of CG removals, which effectively amplify
one country’s law enforcement actions to users around the world.

Does the Chinese model tell us that nations can have their cake and eat it too—
maintain a bordered, regulated Internet without sacrificing a flourishing
Internet commercial sector?

Min Jiang identified a similar shift toward “voluntary” platform content removal in China.
There, she said, content removal is increasingly initiated by platforms themselves, rather than
government. The mesh of laws and operating licenses governing their operations give platforms
strong incentives to internalize law enforcement goals and proactively remove potentially illegal
information. At the same time, Jiang said, legal authority is often highly fragmented among
different government actors and sources of law. A vast array of overlapping national and
regional authorities have some say over Internet content issues. In addition, many of the most
41

important laws come from local regulation or other “lower level” sources of law—with only
about ten percent of relevant law for platforms coming from sources like statutes, national
regulations, or court decisions.
In addition, China famously has preserved bordered Internet access for citizens, using the “Great
Firewall” and other technical and legal tools. Jiang explained the Chinese Internet of today as the
product of a long and deliberate government policy of “Internet sovereignty.” As early as 1995,
the Chinese telecommunications minister stated the country’s intention to preserve territorial
borders online, comparing online communication to international travel: when you cross borders,
you must go through customs, show your passport, and abide by national laws. “There is no
contradiction at all,” he wrote, “between the development of telecommunications infrastructure
and the exercise of State sovereignty.” Following this policy, China has, in Jiang’s words,
“painstakingly grafted borders onto the Internet.”
A striking feature of the Chinese story, Jiang pointed out, is the economic success of Chinese
Internet companies in recent years. Does the Chinese model tell us that nations can have their
cake and eat it too—maintain a bordered, regulated Internet without sacrificing a flourishing
Internet commercial sector? This question may become all the more pressing given, as other
conference participants pointed out, the apparent interest of Russia and other countries in
following a similar path.
In her closing remarks, Jiang described a shift toward a “re-nationalized,” bordered Internet –
with erosion of liberties and increasing surveillance and filtering of online communications. As
she noted, this trend is by no means limited to China. Lawmakers around the world are
increasingly troubled by online content that violates their laws, and increasingly aggressive about
enforcement. A similar observation was voiced by Google’s Juniper Downs. Describing her own
conversations with governments, she observed “a real inflection point” regarding platforms’ role
in policing user-generated content. Andrea Glorioso of the European Commission, who was
participating in his personal capacity, weighed in from the audience to echo the observation. The
Internet industry, he said, severely underestimates the emerging climate of localism in both the
EU and the US. The internationalism that has long characterized Internet policy is waning, and
the demand from national governments for Internet companies to solve problems created by
online content is growing.

If the alternatives are “harmonization” of national laws via private platforms’
Terms of Service, or an increasingly bordered and fragmented Internet
governed by national laws, which do we actually prefer?

This shift in government and public expectations is importantly connected to platforms’
voluntary enforcement of CGs as a basis for removing online content. Are CGs the new de facto
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source of international norms – resolving regional differences not through transnational
cooperation of governments, but through unilateral action of private companies? If platforms’
choices are not truly unilateral but shaped by pressure from powerful State actors, should that
raise concern about extraterritorial action by national governments? If the alternative to
“harmonization” of national laws via private platform CGs is an increasingly bordered and
fragmented Internet, which do we actually prefer? Our evolving answers to these questions will
determine the real-world power of State and private actors, and the real-world choices of Internet
users seeking information or exercising expression rights online, in the coming years.

43

Appendix 1: Survey Results
As part of the conference’s closed session with invited participants, CIS circulated a survey.
The results are below. These draw on a relatively small sample -- just 21 people -- each with
expertise in online jurisdiction issues. The responses are illuminating both for the points of
relative consensus and those which generated very little agreement.
For the questions shown on pages 45-47, participants wrote answers in their own words. We
grouped similar responses (such as “universal rights” and “human rights”) as the same for
purposes of our count. Even so, many questions elicited widely varying responses. The
widest variation related to blackletter doctrine and geoblocking. For those topics, we have
reproduced answers verbatim.

In what situations, or for what kinds of legal claims, is it most
appropriate to order extraterritorial deletion?
Effects/harm in jurisdiction

6

Violates universal rights

5

Child sex abuse images (CSAI)

5

Jurisdiction is domicile of defendant

2

Under treaty

2

Hate speech

2

Other (revenge porn, fraud, danger)

3

In what situations, or for what kinds of legal claims, is it least
appropriate to order extraterritorial deletion?
Speech/political speech

6

Law is local - not universal or agreed
by treaty

7

Other (data protection, civil claims,
most non-CSAI, lack of jurisdiction)

5

Of the legal issues discussed in the conference, what topics are
different national governments around the world most likely to agree
on?

8

CSAI
Copyright
Intellectual property
Other (treaty, failure of territoriality,
domicile, speech/censorship, law enforcement,
human rights, protection of minorities)

6
2
7
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Of the legal issues discussed in the conference, what topics are
different national governments around the world least likely to agree
on?
Speech/political speech

6

Privacy/Data protection

6

Hate speech

3

Right to be forgotten

2

Defamation

2

Local issues (norms, economy, law)
Law enforcement including backdoors

3
2

Other (religion, pornography,
intermediary liability)

3

Do you see emerging consensus on any of these issues among other
groups of stakeholders (companies, civil society, etc.)? If so, what?
No

3

Yes, CSAI

2

Yes, US First Amendment is not global

2

Yes, nothing specified

2

Other (terrorism, free expression, copyright, power
of terms of service, privacy rights are global, failure
of territoriality, varying interpretations of human
rights)

7

In plaintiff’s country, what branches of national government should
be most interested and concerned when courts in one country
order deletion of content in another?
Courts

5

Foreign Ministry / State
Executive
Other (all, legislature, communications,
trade, justice, human rights, culture)

3
2
7
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In defendant’s country, what branches of national government
should be most interested and concerned when courts in one
country order deletion of content in another?
5

Courts
4

Executive
Foreign Ministry / State

3

Legislature

3

Communications
Justice
Other (all, trade, human
rights, culture)

2
2
4

Do you believe international agreement among countries on
issues of jurisdiction and choice of law for Internet content
removal is possible? By what year?
No
Yes - average predicted year is 2025

9
7
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Do courts have the doctrinal tools they need to resolve
cross-border deletion requests? If not, what would help?
Yes

4

> Willingness to defer to congruent rules made
by non-governmental polities.
> Local law.
> Do they come before courts? In the UK, only
for piracy and trademark.
> If they consider/apply international norms; yet
respect sovereignty with limits.

No

12

> A modern articulation of comity factors.
Online cases should not be viewed as
locations, and need new factors such as global
impact and human rights.
> Standard for determining whether a judicially
mandated or court supervised document is
sufficient for due process and rule of law.
> A clear legal analysis of extraterritoriality as it
relates to jurisdiction.
> Multilaterial international human rights
consensus.
> A new jurisprudential framework for
jurisdiction.

Is geoblocking in response to national laws an emerging norm for
online publishers and intermediaries? If so, does that raise any
concerns for you?
Yes

12

> User choice. Withholding content that's lawful in
the jurisdiction. Cost for small companies to
implement.
> The fragmentation of the Internet. Balkanization.
> Wikimedia is not divided by country, but by
language. Speakers of some languages span many
places with wildly varying laws.

No

4

> It seems it is not seen as enough, compared to
global blocking, and this is a concern.
> Fragmentation of cyberspace but this is already
happening in terms of localized products.
> A clear legal analysis of extraterritoriality as it
relates to jurisdiction.

> Silent censorship. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Collateral damage.
> I think there is something of a technical burden
on smaller companies as geoblocking advances.
> Huge ambit for abuse. Blunt instrument.
> Disruption of the ideal of free end to end
connection.
> The best solution that we have, in balancing
respect for national laws in countries when the
company has subjected itself to jurisdiction with a
general commitment to promote free expression
and access to information. But it also depends on
companies being very careful about which
countries they enter.
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What activities by an online publisher or intermediary defendant
should suffice for a court to order the defendant to delete or delist content outside of the forum state’s territory?
SUFFICIENT

Content is accessible in
the forum state

1

Defendant has minimun
contacts in the forum state

0

Defendant
targets
directs actions to
forum state

2

or
the

Defendant makes money
from the forum state

0

Content is stored on
servers in the forum state

1

Defendant’s
locus
of
control or action is in
forum state

5

Harm is in the forum state

RELEVANT
BUT NOT
SUFFICIENT

DOESN’T
MATTER

9

11

14

7

13

5

6

5

9

11

11

5

13

5

3
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Appendix 2: Hypothetical Situations for Group
Discussion
The second, closed day of the Law, Borders, and Speech Conference included a lively debate
about the following three hypothetical scenarios. We are sharing them in hopes that others may
find them equally provocative and useful. They are generally based on real life, but include
significant simplifications, changes, or fact patterns invented for the purpose of the exercise.

Internet Platforms
Hypo 1: Anne Frank and Wikipedia
Wikimedia receives a DMCA removal request from the US copyright holders for The Diary of
Anne Frank, demanding that Wikipedia remove all links to, or hosted copies of, the original
Dutch-language version of the diary. The diary is in the public domain under Dutch copyright
law, but still protected by US copyright law. Wikimedia is legally established in the US, and its
employees and servers are all here. It has separate Dutch and English-language pages about the
diary, and allows users to navigate to either one. Both the Dutch and English pages have links to
a Wikimedia-hosted copy of the diary at the time the DMCA request arrives. What should it do
in response to the request?15

Hypo 2: Reddit and Russia
In 2013, Russian regulator Roskomnadzor ordered Russian ISPs to block a page on reddit.com
where Russian users discussed illegal drugs. Because Reddit encrypts traffic using HTTPS, the
ISPs could only block the entire site—not individual pages. Russia later agreed to lift the ban,
and Reddit agreed to block traffic at its end by preventing users with Russian IP addresses from
accessing pages that violate Russian law. This allowed the rest of Reddit to remain accessible in
Russia.16
Suppose that Roskomnadzor notifies Reddit that another page violates Russian law. This one
offers psychological support for gay and transgender teenagers in Russia. Russian regulators say,
and local counsel in Russia confirms, that the page violates Russia’s “gay propaganda” laws.
What should Reddit do now?

Hypo 3: DuckDuckGo and the EU

15

These facts are simplified based on the real world example described here. Among other differences,
the public domain status of the diary in the Netherlands is disputed in real life.
16 Up to this point the hypo tracks reported facts.
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DuckDuckGo is a search engine company based in Pennsylvania. It prides itself on protecting
users’ privacy by not tracking them.
The company has no offices, employees, or servers outside the US, and it does not deposit
cookies on users’ machines. It does sell advertising space in search results, including to
advertisers in the EU. It allows ad campaigns to target users in particular countries or regions,
presumably based on the user’s IP address. It also lets users create accounts in order to
participate in discussion forums, including forums for open source developers who contribute
code to the search engine. It supports informal in-person “Quack & Hack” meetings for these
developers, including in the EU. The Strasbourg Quack & Hack group, for example, has 98
members. According to alexa.com, at least 23% of DuckDuckGo’s traffic comes from users in
the EU.
The EU’s pending General Data Protection Regulation, which goes into effect in 2018, arguably
applies to DuckDuckGo because of the accounts it maintains for EU users. French Counsel has
advised the company that the law is unclear, but she thinks there is a 40% chance that regulators
and courts would find jurisdiction to apply the law to the company. If that happens,
DuckDuckGo would face some expensive legal and technical compliance work, and also have to
honor “Right to Be Forgotten” requests for search results. French regulators maintain that such
de-listings must apply globally, not just to results seen by European users. The search engine
currently does not honor such requests, which means that European users can use DuckDuckGo
to find results that Google has de-listed.17
Suppose that in October 2018, the CEO of a French shipping company threatens to sue
DuckDuckGo if it does not de-list search results linking to allegations that he cheated on his
taxes ten years ago. The French Data Protection Authority agrees that he has a right to de-list the
results. What should DuckDuckGo do now?

17

Facts up to here are based on reporting by DuckDuckGo and other Internet sources – though not
always clearly reliable ones, so take these details with a grain of salt. Main exceptions: (1) in real life,
DuckDuckGo partners with Bing and Yahoo for ads and results; (2) we made up the legal prediction
about odds of French lawmakers finding jurisdiction over DuckDuckGo.
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Appendix 3: Glossary: Internet Content Blocking
Options and Vocabulary
Daphne Keller
Conversations about unlawful online content and the responsibilities of Internet intermediaries
have become more heated in recent years. Participants in these discussions often lack common
terminology or understanding of technological options for online content control.
This problem is not entirely new—there has never been a single agreed set of terms, and people
have often used the same terms to mean different things. But miscommunications become more
consequential as governments expand legal mandates for intermediaries. Different blocking
technologies lead to different outcomes, which can include under-blocking unlawful content,
over-blocking lawful content, or disrupting service to users. They can also place different
burdens on intermediaries, and make it easier or harder for users to circumvent the blocks or for
researchers to detect them.
This document briefly lists key terms as the author has seen them most commonly used. It also
lists common sources of confusion.18

I. Common Terms
Intermediaries: Entities that “give access to, host, transmit and index content originated by third
parties or provide Internet-based services to third parties.”19 There are many kinds of
intermediaries, but for purposes of content blocking or removal they can generally be clustered
into two groups with different capabilities.20




Network intermediaries, which provide technological connections between two
endpoints, can sever that connection. (Examples: ISPs, mobile carriers, content delivery
networks, and DNS providers.)
Hosting intermediaries, which store user content on their servers, can remove content or
restrict access to it. 21 (Examples: consumer-facing hosts such as Facebook, back-end
hosting providers such as Amazon Web Services.)

Joe Hall and Jim Greer kindly checked this for errors. If I introduced any after their review, it’s my fault.
OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, (Apr. 2010)
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf at 4.
20 End-to-end design principles would suggest moving blocking capabilities away from these
intermediaries and toward the edges of the network —for example, by enabling blocking at the level of
an individual user’s mobile phone or browser. See Larry Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001) pp. 34-39;
Cyberspace’s Architectural Constitution (1999) https://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/www9.pdf.
21 For purposes of content blocking and removal, a search engine or other entity providing links to content
functions like a host. Removing a link typically means removing hosted HTML. For search engines, it
may include page title, snippet text, the link itself, and cache copies of webpage.
18
19
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Content Providers: “[T]hose individuals or organizations who are responsible for producing
information in the first place and posting it online.”22
Remove or take down: To erase or restrict access to online content, in whole or in part.
Block: To prevent a user from accessing content, without taking the content itself offline.


Variations in the blocking target: Sometimes intermediaries block particular content (like
when an ISP stops all its users from going to a website or using an app). Sometimes they
block particular users (like when a website blocks all users with IP addresses from a
certain country). Sometimes they do both at once (like when Twitter prevents users in a
particular country from seeing a particular tweet—which they call withholding content).



Variations in the blocking implementation: An intermediary can block content
completely, or can do more subtle or complex things like degrading service (as can
happen to foreign websites passing through the “Great Firewall of China”), demoting
content visibility (as Google web search has done on DMCA grounds), removing content
but notifying users who try to access it that it was removed (as WordPress does for
DMCA removals), warning users before they choose to view content (as the Blogger
platform does for adult content), or even supplementing offensive content with additional
context or counter-speech (as Google did in response to the 2004 “jew watch”
controversy, and Jigsaw has done with newer tools).



Variations in the means used to identify information for blocking: In order to block users
or content, an intermediary must have a way for machines to identify which Internet
communications are to be blocked.
o Users may be blocked based on identifying information such as an account, or
location information such as an IP address.
o Content is most commonly blocked based on its location. Intermediaries can
block based on a web URL (like www.example.com for an entire site or
www.example.com/page for a single page)23 or an IP address (like

22

Article 19, Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability (2013) at 6,
https://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf. For some purposes, such as
copyright, the law must also distinguish between original authors and those who merely re-post
information.
23 “URL-based blocking compares the website requested by the user with a pre-determined “blacklist” of
URLs of objectionable websites selected by the intermediary imposing the blocking. URLs (or uniform
resource locators, otherwise known more colloquially as “web addresses”) are character strings that
constitute a reference (an address) to a resource on the internet and that are usually displayed inside
an address bar located at the top of the user interface of web browsers.” Angelopolous et al, Study of
fundamental rights limitations for online enforcement through self regulation (2016)
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1796, at 7.
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216.3.128.12).24 In some cases they can disrupt elements of the Domain Name
System in order to prevent a URL from resolving to the correct IP address.25
Location-based blocking can be over-inclusive (like by blocking all content on an
IP address, when only some of it is unlawful) and under-inclusive (like by
blocking one instance of an MP3 file, when identical copies exist at other
locations).
o Intermediaries can also block based on technical specifications (such as blocking
a port to prevent use of VOIP).
o Most ambitiously, intermediaries may block by building software capable of
recognizing specific content. See “Filter”, below.


Websites that protect their users through SSL encryption (indicated by “HTTPS” in the
browser address bar) may suffer unintended consequences if network intermediaries
attempt to block content on the site. With SSL in place, an ISP monitoring user traffic
may only be able to identify the site being accessed (www.example.com)—not the
individual page (www.example.com/page) or any of its content. As a result, an ISP’s only
options may be to block an entire site, including huge sites like youtube.com or
wikipedia.org, or to block none of it.26

Monitor: To review online information with the goal of identifying specific, usually
objectionable content. Automated monitoring tools look for particular content, such as an image
or a phrase.
Filter: To take “action against material identified through monitoring in order to then block
access to it or remove it[.]”27 Tools that hosting intermediaries can use to filter content include
“This operates in a similar manner to URL blocking, but uses IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, i.e., the
numerical labels assigned to devices, such as computers, that participate in a network that uses the
internet protocol for communication. IP-based blocking has a higher chance of resulting in unintended
‘over-blocking’ than targeted URL blocking as a result of IP sharing, as a given unique IP address may
correspond to multiple URLs of different websites hosted on the same server.” Angelopolous et al at 7.
25 There are many variants on DNS disruption, ranging from DNS seizures (which break DNS resolution
for users globally) to DNS disruption by ISPs, which affect only their users.
26 The distinction between “location” and “content” can be fuzzy – very much as the distinction between
“metadata” and “content of communications” is fuzzy in the surveillance context. For example, a URL
designates location, but can also tell you something about the content of the page. (Example:
www.example.com/donaldtrump.htm).
27 “Monitoring tools such as content control software can be placed at various levels in the internet
structure: they can be implemented by all intermediaries operating in a certain geographical area or
only by one or some of those intermediaries; they can be applied to all of the customers of an
intermediary or only to some of them (for example only to customers originating form country X); they
can look only for certain content which is commonly transmitted through specific services (such as
illegal file sharing through peer-to-peer networks) or indiscriminately to all content.” Angelopolous et al
at 6. In order to effectively catch specific content, monitoring must be “systematic, universal, and
progressive.” AG Cruz Villalon in SABAM Opinion, quoted in Angelopolous et al.
24
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keyword blocklists,28 PhotoDNA for duplicate images,29 AudibleMagic for duplicate audio
tracks,30 or YouTube’s ContentID for duplicate video.31 They can also use human monitors, or a
combination of technical and human monitoring. For ISPs, it is sometimes possible to identify
and block content using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), but this is computationally expensive.
Content-based blocking is often costly. The risk of over- or under-inclusion—of blocking too
much or too little—varies substantially depending on kind of technology, content, and legal
claim at issue.32
Geolocate: to determine the location of a device, typically a user’s computer or mobile phone.
This is typically done using IP address, GPS, WiFi network identification, or other technical
information.
Geoblock: to use geolocation data to block particular devices or users (like Reddit blocking
Russian users from certain pages).

II. Sources of Confusion
Miscommunication about removal issues often involves one of the following questions.
1. Is the intermediary a network intermediary, or a hosting intermediary?
This matters, because network intermediaries can block the channel of transmission, preventing
users from reaching content (example: ISP blocking an IP address). Hosting intermediaries, on
the other hand, can take content offline completely (example: YouTube removing a video based
on a DMCA request). See “Intermediaries” definition, above.
2. How is the intermediary identifying information to block?
The technological means for blocking content are rarely perfect. Many blocking mechanisms
foreseeably lead to specific types of over- or under-blocking. Blocking an IP address, for
example, prevents users from accessing any lawful material that shares an IP address with the
targeted content. Blocking a specific webpage may be ineffective if the webmaster merely reposts the same content on a different part of the site. Filtering tools like ContentID that identify
duplicate content may fail to recognize modified copies on the one hand, or erroneously remove

28

Keyword blocking typically involves identifying words or strings in static online content. Over-removal
issues with keyword blocklists of this sort are well illustrated in the Wikipedia entry for the Scunthorpe
Problem, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scunthorpe_problem. Intermediaries can also keyword block text
submitted by users – for example, a search engine might show no results if a user searches for
“Tiananmen.”
29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PhotoDNA
30 https://www.audiblemagic.com/
31 https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en
32 See, e.g., http://www.engine.is/the-limits-of-filtering.
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satire and other lawful use on the other. See “Variation in the means used to identify information
for blocking,” above.
3. Is “bad” content completely deleted, or does something else happen?
Removal can be partial and incomplete in various ways. For example, intermediaries can deny
access to content for just some users (based on location, age, etc.), or some user activities (such
as searching for certain specific names on Google under “Right to Be Forgotten” laws). An
intermediary can also demote certain content (putting it lower in search results or a news feed),
degrade connection speed (making it hard to load a page or watch a video), or otherwise deter
users from accessing it (such as through a malware warning or fake news label). To my
knowledge, there is no good umbrella term that encompasses all these options. See “Variations
in the blocking implementation,” above.

III. Other Sources of Information


https://www.internetsociety.org/doc/internet-content-blocking
Excellent and up-to-date re network intermediaries; not comprehensive re hosting
intermediaries.



https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hall-censorship-tech-04
Excellent and recent, great citations, somewhat technical. (Per IETF practice, “expired”
as of January 2017 and not to be cited, but future version may be released as RFC.)



http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accessdenied-chapter-3.pdf;
https://opennet.net/about-filtering
Technically good but probably drafted ten years ago and some terminology does not
match current normal use. (Project was launched in 2004, shut down in 2014.)
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Appendix 4: Recommended Readings
Cases













Google and Commission Nationale de L’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) (“Right to
Be Forgotten” case)
o Conseil d’Etat ruling
o CJEU ruling expected 2018
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc. (fka Equustek v. Jack)
o Ruling, Supreme Court of Canada, 2017
o Amicus briefs listed under “Intellectual Property Law” and “Human Rights Law,”
below
o CIS blog post and Graham Smith post on Canadian ruling
o CIS blog post on US challenge to Canadian ruling
X v. Twitter, New South Wales Supreme Court, Australia, 2017
EFF v. Global Equity, US District Court, 2017
eDate/Martinez, CJEU, 2011
Pammer/Alpenhoff, CJEU, 2010
Pinckney v. Mediatech, CJEU 2013
LICRA v. Yahoo! (“Yahoo France” case)
o Ruling, Superior Court of Paris, 2000
o Ruling, US District Court, 2001
o Ruling, US Circuit Court en banc, 2006
Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc., High Court of Australia, 2002

Big Picture









David R. Johnson and David G. Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace.
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, p. 1367 (1996)
Bertrand de la Chapelle and Paul Fehlinger, Jurisdiction on the Internet: From Legal
Arms Race to Transnational Cooperation, commissioned by the Global Commission on
Internet Governance
David G. Post, Internet Infrastructure and IP Censorship
o Summary
o Full PDF
David R. Johnson and David G. Post, ‘Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent': Towards a
New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 Chicago-Kent
L. Rev. 1055 (1998)
Uta Kohl, The Net and the Nation State, (2017) (for purchase)
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Geoblocking Tools and the Law








Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Center for Democracy & Technology
o A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques
o Technology Behind (Geo)Blocking
Marketa Trimble
o The Role of Geoblocking in the Internet Legal Landscape, IDP, Revista de
Internet, Derecho y Política (23) (2017)
o Geoblocking and Evasion of Geoblocking – Technical Standards and the
Law, in GEOBLOCKING AND GLOBAL VIDEO CULTURE (Ramon Lobato & James
Meese eds., Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam) (2016)
o The Territoriality Referendum, 6 WIPO J. 89 (2015)
o Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 22 (2012)
o To Geoblock, or Not To Geoblock – Is That Still a Question?
o Your Movements Shall Be Traced: The New EU Regulation on Cross-Border
Portability
Internet Society, Perspectives on Internet Content Blocking: An Overview
Steven J. Murdoch and Ross Anderson, Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering
OpenNet Initiative, About Filtering

Intellectual Property




Equustek brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation
Equustek brief of FIAPF (Fédération Internationale des Associations des Producteurs de
Films)
Equustek brief of IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry)

Data Protection and the Right to Be Forgotten






Decision no. 2016-054 of March 10, 2016 of the Restricted Committee issuing Google
Inc. with a financial penalty. Authored by Commission nationale de l'informatique et des
libertés
Michel Jose Reymond, Hammering Square Pegs into Round Holes: The Geographical
Scope of Application of the EU Right to Be De-listed Berkman Klein Center Research
Publication No. 2016-12 (2016)
Brendan Van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek, Internet and jurisdiction after Google
Spain: the extraterritorial reach of the ‘right to be de-listed’, International Data Privacy
Law, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 105–120 (2015)
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Human Rights Law



Equustek brief of Human Rights Watch, Article 19, Open Net (Korea), Software Freedom
Law Centre and Center for Technology and Society
Evelyn Aswad, The Role of US Technology Companies as Enforcers of Europe’s New
Internet Hate Speech Ban

Law Enforcement Access to User Data








Albert Gidari MLAT Reform and the 80 Percent Solution
Andrew K. Woods and Jennifer Daskal, Cross-Border Data Requests: A Proposed
Framework
Andrew K. Woods and Jennifer Daskal, Congress Should Embrace the DOJ’s CrossBorder Data Fix
Proposed UK-US MLAT legislative change to forego MLATs and to permit direct
disclosure of content to UK authorities
GDPR Art. 48: “Any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an
administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer
or disclose personal data may only be recognized or enforceable in any manner if based
on an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between
the requesting third country and the Union or a Member State, without prejudice to other
grounds for transfer pursuant to this Chapter.”
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

Black Letter Law




Dan Svantesson, A doctrine of ‘market sovereignty’ to solve international law issues on
the Internet? 2014
Dan Svantesson, A Third Dimension of Jurisdiction, 2015
Dan Svantesson, Solving the Internet Jurisdiction Puzzle, 2017 (for purchase)

Real Power, Real Outcomes, Realpolitik







Backpage.com v. Dart - 7th Circuit Court of Appeals decision
CDT’s amicus brief in Backpage.com v. Dart
The rule of law on the Internet and in the wider digital world, Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights
European Commission Hate Speech Code of Conduct
CDT letter to Commissioner Jourova describing concerns: https://cdt.org/insight/letter-toeuropean-commissioner-on-code-of-conduct-for-illegal-hate-speech-online/
Commissioner Jourova response
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ARTICLE 19 analysis of Code

Other Projects




Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network
o Project Page
o Content and Jurisdiction Policy Options
o Retrospect Database of news and developments
Geneva Internet Disputes Resolution Policies 1.0, Topic 1: Which national courts shall
have jurisdiction in Internet-related disputes?
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Appendix 5: Speaker Presentations
Uta Kohl, Aberystwyth University
What happened to the ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ in the online global order?
A black letter tool to encourage jurisdictional restraint on the internet?
Today I want to talk about the presumption against extraterritoriality and why it has figured –
rather paradoxically – very rarely in Internet cases and but why it may after all be a useful tool to
encourage the coexistence of territorial state law on the internet through mutual restraint. Let me
start with Hannah Buxbaum’s ideas on territoriality and extraterritoriality. She says:
‘“Territoriality” and “extraterritoriality”… are legal constructs. They are claims of authority, or
of resistance to authority that are made by particular actors with particular substantive interests to
promote.’33 In other words, territoriality (or territoriality of law and order) is not a ‘natural’ state
of affairs, but a legal construction created to protect certain interests and resisted by others.
Furthermore and however ill-suited it may be for the global (online) market place, territoriality
remains the norm or the default standard for legitimate authority. By the same token,
‘extraterritoriality’ is something outside the norm and carries with it a strong whiff of
illegitimacy. So, actors in cross-boundary disputes – whether individuals, corporations or States
– invariably invoke the concept of extraterritoriality to assert that a state has gone beyond its
authority. That very contest between legitimate and illegitimate authority also strongly (albeit not
completely) underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality, which in its very essence
embodies the exceptionality of extraterritoriality.
Before coming to this, however, let me briefly reflect on the drivers behind
jurisdictional contests. Partly, undoubtedly, they are driven by cultural and political diversity
or the desire of each State to uphold its collective notion of the ‘good life’ within its borders and
for its population. That desire then makes it clear why extraterritorial overreach is often
delegitimised by invoking human rights, in particular free speech. One State’s effort to control
information flows in accordance with its own political priorities often impacts on the free
uninhibited information flow elsewhere. This view is undoubtedly a valid perspective for many
of the Internet jurisdiction disputes. Yet, not all. Many Internet jurisdiction disputes may more
usefully be constructed as free trade cases, rather than free speech contestations (even if they
have speech implications) in order to understand their underlying dynamics. A clear-cut example
lies in the cross-border online gambling regulation by the US which is intended to protect its
local gambling industry from foreign online competitors. However, there are also more
33

Hannah L Buxbaum, ‘Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict’ (2009) 57 AM.
J. COMP. L. 631, 635
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ambiguous cases which are driven by economic interests that have speech repercussions, such as
trademark/domain name disputes or even data protection actions. Typically, the Spanish claimant
in the EU “Right to Be Forgotten” case relied on data protection to protect his ‘informational
self-determinacy’ which in turn was designed to protect his business as a solicitor. Data is a
valuable commodity, the most valuable we have today, and the CJEU with its judgment pushed
some of that value back from Google to the European user. Should the extraterritoriality of the
ruling be understood and/or challenged on the basis that it is inconsistent with free speech (as
understood outside but not within Europe) or as European economic protectionism? This is
something worth pondering.
Coming to the presumption against extraterritoriality, most of you, if you are lawyers, will be
familiar with it from your first year in law school, as a basic tool of statutory construction. But if
you are not a lawyer and you are the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ (as we would say in the
UK), you know the presumption without knowing that you know it; it’s popular wisdom and
deeply embedded in the social imagination. It is that France has a right to regulate what occurs
on French soil and not beyond, unless there are exceptional circumstances, and the same applies
to every other country. And this is exactly what the presumption against extraterritoriality
provides: legislation applies to persons and matters within the territory of the State, but not to
persons and matters outside the territory, unless the legislation evinces a contrary intention.
The presumption is applied by the judiciary to interpret the territorial
application of legislation, making the assumption that, bar exceptional circumstances, a
national parliament would not try to regulate outside its borders. So, here the presumption
applies to substantive law, be it criminal, regulatory or civil. In the 2004 US antitrust case of
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran S.A., 34 the Supreme Court applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality to the Sherman Act, holding that foreign conduct causing foreign harm
lay outside the mischief the Act sought to remedy. More recently, the presumption has also been
applied to judicial jurisdiction; here it does not limit the effect of the substantive law, but the
competence of local courts to hear certain claims. In 2013, in Kiobel v Shell, 35 the Supreme
Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the Alien Tort Statute, which
had led to much human rights litigation against multinational corporations, and restricted judicial
competence under that statute to those matters that have a strong connection with the US.
What does the presumption seek to achieve? It advocates caution and restraint in
extraterritorial regulatory assertions, saying that in the vast majority of cases it is inappropriate to
extend the law and litigation to matters that lie outside the State’s territory. In other words, it
does exactly what the ordinary man instinctively knows: stick to your borders. In Empagran the
Supreme Court explained this caution by saying: ‘This Court ordinarily construes ambiguous
statues to avoid unreasonable interference with other nations’ sovereign authority. This rule of
construction reflects customary international law principles and cautions courts to assume that
legislators take account of other nations’ legitimate sovereign interests when writing American
laws. It thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in
34
35

542 US 155 (2004).
133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
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harmony.’ (emphasis added) The Court then explained that the comity concern remains real
insofar as other nations may not have adopted antitrust law similar to the US or, even if they had,
they may ‘disagree dramatically about appropriate remedies.’ The presumption is driven by the
potential conflict of different laws and in recognition of each nation’s sovereign authority and the
desire for harmonious global working order. Of course, it is only a presumption and can be set
aside by appropriate evidence. Extraterritoriality may be ‘reasonable, and hence consistent with
principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as [the laws] reflect a legislative effort to redress
domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.’
Now let us think about the Internet cases where the presumption would appear to be
highly pertinent, given that each State’s regulation of online activity always has some
extraterritorial effect. Yet, despite its intuitive relevance, the presumption has been almost
entirely absent from the Internet governance debate and judicial jurisdiction reasoning. (A rare
exception is the Microsoft case, but that case is not quite the standard internet jurisdiction
scenario insofar as its deals with enforcement activity.) In the standard internet jurisdiction case,
judges simply find that the foreign online content or service provider has to comply with local
law on the basis that a local injury is caused or a local interest is affected by the foreign website
or online activity. This approach means that the law and its application to the facts is either not
treated as extraterritorial at all (i.e., we are only regulating what occurs in our territory) OR,
alternatively, the presumption is displaced, along Empagran reasoning that the law’s territorial
overreach is justified as a legislative effort that simply seeks to redress a domestic injury caused
by foreign conduct. Whilst from an internal, national perspective such reasoning seems quite
reasonable, the presumption against extraterritoriality has an in-built global perspective; it
recognises the interests of other States against the regulating States and the global interest in a
global harmonious working order. So such internal perspective is out of kilter with the
presumption’s in-built aim.

Let us now have a look at Art 3 of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) 36 which lays down the territorial scope of the EU data protection
regime and is entirely consistent with the body of Internet jurisdiction cases (using ‘jurisdiction’
in the broad sense of involving the adjudicative and legislative competence of States). Through
Art 3, the European legislator evinces an intention to apply the GDPR extraterritorially (i.e., a
displacement of the presumption) in three different ways:
First, it applies the GDPR ‘to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an
establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing
takes place in the Union or not’ (Art 3(1)). This builds on the approach taken in Art 4(1)(a) of the
Data Protection Directive,37 as applied in Google Spain,38 but makes it an express stipulation

36
37

2016/679; adopted on 27 April 2016, enters into force in May 2018.
95/46. Article 4(1)(a): ‘Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to the processing of personal data where (a) the processing is carried out in the context of the
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the same
controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the necessary
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that the location of the processing is irrelevant to the competence question, as long as the
processing occurred ‘in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller.’ So this
approach gives legislative validation to the CJEU judgement in Google Spain that foiled
Google’s attempt to bring itself outside the EU regime by virtue of its non-EU-localised
processing activities.
Second, Art 3(2) applies the GDPR ‘to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are
in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing
activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment
of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their
behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union.’ (emphasis added) So again the
processing may well place outside the EU and the only connection with the EU needed are the
(commercial) activities of the controller or processors. This Article throttles attempts to avoid the
effect of Art 3(1) through not having an establishment in the EU whilst still doing online
business in the EU, for example social networking or sharing economy websites. Although this
Article purports to look at to whom the foreign web activity is in substance targeted, in fact it
does not ask whether Europeans are a main or rather marginal target of the site and thus is hardly
consistent with the ‘targeting’ or ‘directing’ approach that has been advocated as a more
moderate approach to jurisdictional assertions.
Third, through Art 3(3), the GDPR is extended ‘to the processing of personal data by a controller
not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public
international law.’ This last head is effectively a catch-all provision that allows for any cases to
be brought within the GDPR that has not already been legitimised by the previous two heads.
After all, public international law is highly permissive in terms of adjudicative/prescriptive
jurisdiction, particularly in the form of a very flexible territoriality principle.
While Article 3 appears excessive in its extraterritorial reach, seeking to bring into its
ambit everyone and anyone who deals, however marginally, with personal data of the ‘data
subjects who are in the Union’, in fact its approach is unexceptional. It perfectly fits within the
broad body of transnational Internet regulation through States, starting with various US cases
from 1996, to LICRA v. Yahoo! in France in 2001 and Gutnick39 in Australia in 2002, to the
recent Equustek Solutions Inc v. Jack40 in Canada. This body shows no sign of the restraint and
caution that the presumption against extraterritoriality advocates in the name of the greater
orderly global public good. The body makes extraterritorial regulation the norm rather than the
exception on the basis that the formerly exceptional case of local injury caused by foreign
conduct has become the norm. The default of State regulation is extraterritoriality in perfect
unison with the default global reach of online activity.
measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the
national law applicable.’
38

Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja
González (2014) Case C-131/12.
39 Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc. [2002] HCA 56.
40 Equustek Solutions Inc v. Jack 2014 BCSC 1063. This presentation pre-dated the Canadian Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision, which affirmed the appellate ruling referenced here.
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Whereas on a technical legal level the result of this position signals the effective expiry of the
presumption, in broader regulatory terms the presumption reflects and embodies a global order
based on State law and thus the presumption’s non-viability is a marker of the non-viability of
the State as an effective regulatory agent. Where everybody regulates everything (or at least in
principle asserts the right to do so) or where a system of regulatory allocation is entirely
predicated of might over right (i.e., enforcement jurisdiction), its practical or principled utility
and efficacy is under threat. Where France does not just regulate France but also the rest of the
world and where this principle is extended to every other State, the State-based system of law
and order has broken down and lost its raison d'être. From a more close-up, constructive
perspective, the routine non-applicability or displacement of the presumption in transnational
internet cases requires its re-thinking and a re-framing. Such re-thinking would aim to
reintroduce a measure of restraint and caution into competence assertions, so much so that not
every foreign online provider who has contacts with local residents is always exposed to local
law. The alternative is the demise of the Internet as a global communication space.
Thank you.
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Graft Borders onto the Internet:
Chinese Internet Sovereignty
Min Jiang (Ph.D.)
Associate Professor @ UNC Charlotte
Secretariat Member, Chinese Internet Research Conference

The Internet in China Whitepaper
■ “Within Chinese territory the Internet is
under the jurisdiction of Chinese
sovereignty… Citizens of the People’s
Republic of China and foreign citizens, legal
persons and other organizations within
Chinese territory have the right and
freedom to use the Internet; at the same
time, they must obey the laws and
regulations of China and conscientiously
protect Internet security.”
- State Council Information Office (2010)

“Computer education must start with kids”
- Deng Xiaoping (1984)

“By linking with the Internet, we don’t
mean
absolute
freedom
of
information… If you go through
customs, you have to show your
passport. It’s the same with
management of information. There is
no contradiction at all between the
development of telecommunications
infrastructure and the exercise of state
sovereignty.”
- Wu Jichuan (1995)
Former Minister of Posts and Telecommunications

Chinese Internet Regulatory Agencies

Source: Miao, Pang & Jiang (2017). Manuscript under review.

Regulatory Policies by Type
(1994-2015)

Source: Miao, Pang & Jiang (2017). Manuscript under review.

A New Internet World
■ Re-nationalization of the Internet
– Return of borders, cybersecurity

■ No longer dominated by liberal values/practices
– 22% “Partly Free” (Freedom House)
– 30% “Not Free”

■ Erosion of civil liberties in “democracies”
– NSA, Snowden Affair, Gawker, Trump

■ Global surveillance and filtering as the norm
– By states and Internet giants

2-Trillion-Dollar Photo (2015)

